About Jeremy Pressman

professor, Arab-Israeli stuff, Middle East, Red Sox fan. Twitter: @djpressman

Diskin’s Prayer: On Israel, Gaza, and the next war

Yuval Diskin was head of Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet, from 2005-2011. He posted this prayer in Hebrew earlier today on Facebook. 

A Prayer of a Father in a War of No Choice?
by Yuval Diskin

My heart is with my brothers and sisters and the masses of Israeli citizens currently under attack from rockets and missiles. My heart is also with those Palestinians in the Gaza Strip that did not choose this war, have become, against their wills, human shields for the terrorists of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the other terror organizations, and have absorbed hundreds of tons of explosives from the air.

My heart is with all the parents whose sons are on the front and who may – in a few more hours or days – enter this miserable place whose name is the Gaza Strip. Everyone who has seen and spent days and nights with sewage flowing in the streets of the miserable refugee camps in Gaza, the West Bank (or for those who want, Judea and Samaria), and Lebanon is able to understand how much we must find a way to resolve this bloody conflict at least partially.

And yes… in the current situation, I think that it is necessary to do everything possible in order to the stop the rockets from the Gaza Strip. And, if there is no other choice, also a ground invasion provided the invasion will have real goals and will not be intended just for the consumption of the incited masses in the hands of the religious fanatics and cynical politicians.

Whoever is familiar with this endless cycle of bloodshed and hatred knows how much the next war is already filled with the blood of the current war. I know and remember this frustrating sense before every operation or war. It is the moment when you realize deep inside yourself the futility and the foolishness of it and, especially, how much in war there are not really any winners…as much as the war escalates and continues, one can see more and more clearly how much it is unnecessary and how much one could have been spared from it if only we had been truly talking out of a desire to solve the conflict, to compromise and build a better future for all of us…

I pray that after everything is finished, we will remember that really at that moment everything starts anew…And when the hourglass is turned over and we begin to count down until the next war, I hope that we will remember that is forbidden for us and for our enemies to pay attention to the same religious fanatics and war-mongering politicians seeking to satisfy the lust of their supporters – on both sides. And how much it is preferable to sit and to resolve what is possible in this bloody conflict.

Until then, I offer a deep prayer that peace and quiet will return quickly to the citizens of Israel in the south, the center, and the north, and that all our regular, reserve, and career soldiers return home in peace, including our four beloved sons. Let it be.

 

Is Shufat in “Occupied East Jerusalem?”

I know it is only a minor footnote to the dangerous events going on in Israel and the West Bank right now, but I was curious about Shufat, home of Mohammed Abu Khdair, the Palestinian teenager killed this week.

Shufat is often described this way:

(Mohyeldin is a foreign correspondent for NBC News)

Or sometimes this way:

Shufat is part of Jerusalem as defined by Israel. After the 1967 War, Israel greatly expanded the borders of eastern Jerusalem, the area it had just captured from Jordan. Under Jordan, (East) Jerusalem was 6.5 sq km. Israel added another 64.4 sq km from the West Bank, including Shufat.

But given that most of the world, including the Palestinian national movement, rejects Israel’s annexation of Jerusalem (or non-annexation according to Ian Lustick – PDF version), on what basis is Shufat part of occupied East Jerusalem as opposed to being identified as part of the occupied West Bank?

When Jordan controlled Shufat from the armistice after the 1948 war until the June 1967 war, Shufat was outside the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem.

The wording of UNGA Resolution 194 (December 11, 1948) also makes clear that Shufat is not part of the city of Jerusalem:

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu’fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Here Shufat – like Abu Dis, Bethlehem, and Ein Karim – is a marker of “the surrounding villages and towns” not part of “the present municipality of Jerusalem.”

@leenbarghouti suggested it was part of the Jerusalem governate both before and after 1948. Can anyone shed light on the idea of a Jerusalem governate either before or after 1967? Would that have been like a regional zone or country?

Is there a deeper history to Shufat as part of the city of Jerusalem that goes beyond Israel’s post-1967 action?

I welcome your input.

 

 

 

The End of Iraq? Or Not….

We again welcome a guest post from James Devine:

With ISIS’ shocking invasion of Mosul this week, there has been speculation that this turn of events will eventually lead to the collapse of the Iraqi state along ethno-religious lines, and perhaps even the establishment of a Salafi Islamic Emirate straddling what is now the border of Iraq and Syria. This may eventually come to pass, however it is still too early to say where this week’s events will lead. There is a complex web of political dynamics at work in Iraq and its environs, some tearing the state apart, some also holding it together.

Given the sudden nature of ISIS’ victory in Mosul and the equally stunning collapse of Iraqi national forces in the city, it’s easy to imagine the militia running the table in Iraq. Within 24 hours of seizing Mosul, ISIS grabbed Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s home village and a Ba’thist strong hold, and is moving toward Baghdad with approximately 6,000 fighters. This is in addition to large parts of Fallujah and Ramadi, which ISIS has controlled since the beginning of the year. The seizure of Mosul also netted ISIS approximately $425 million dollars, making it by some estimates the richest “terrorist” organization in the world. As ISIS’ successes mount, and its resource base expands, it will be able to attract more political followers. While ISIS has already been able to mobilize some disgruntled Iraqi Sunnis and anti-government tribes, it remains a relatively small organization. Mosul, for instance, was taken by approximately 800 fighters. However, if it can hold Mosul and make further gains around the state capital, ISIS’ following will likely grow and the Iraqi state would be fractured.

While this scenario is possible ISIS faces a number of substantial hurdles. First, and foremost, routing the Iraqi national army is one thing, fighting the Kurdish Peshmerga is something else altogether. The Peshmerga is well prepared and combat tested in Najaf (2004) against the Mahdi Army, and the second battle of Fallujah (2004) against Sunni insurgents. They are not likely to cut and run at the sight of 800 members of ISIS. They already appear to have taken control of Kirkuk and are likely preparing for Mosul. Moreover, President Hassan Rouhani has volunteered Iranian support and there are already reports of Iranian military units being dispatched to Iraq. It is not in Iran’s interest to have Iraq dissolve into chaos, and the IRGC along with Hezbollah are already fighting ISIS in Syria. Finally, ISIS continues to face threats to their home base in Syria. ISIS is not just fighting the Syrian government and its allies, but Syrian Kurdish groups and even other Salafi groups such as the al-Nusra Front. If ISIS stays in Iraq they will be fighting a war on two fronts against multiple enemies.

Having said this, while the military defeat of ISIS would end the immediate threat of Iraq splitting apart, it may trigger a slower but no less unstoppable breakdown of the state. Mosul and Kirkuk are on the Green Line that marks territories disputed by both the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil. Tensions between central government forces and Peshmerga forces have been high, particularly since the creation of the Dijla Operations Command in Kirkuk in 2012. Erbil saw the creation of this military command as a land grab, but did not use force to stop it. The decision not to confront Baghdad at the time received a great deal of criticism from within the Kurdish political community. It is therefore very unlikely that Erbil will give up the control it now has over Kirkuk, or the control of Mosul it would have if it expels ISIS in the future. These cities are important symbolically to Erbil, and important because they are the home to large Kurdish populations. They are also important because of oil. Indeed, it has been argued that controlling the energy resources around Kirkuk would give the KRG the income necessary for it to make the final break with Baghdad.

Even if Erbil did not decide the time was right to declare independence, the fact that the Iraqi state had to be saved by the Peshmerga and the IRGC may simply be too much. Iraq spent eight years at war with Iran in the 1980s and has been fighting the Kurds off and on since the country achieved independence. Now they are all that is left holding the Iraq state together? Certainly this would further alienate the country’s Sunni population. It would also signal the Shi’a population that the Malaki government is not up to the job. Although Malaki has earned his share of criticism, given the political divisions within Iraq, it is unclear that anyone else would be able to fill his shoes. Political deadlock and dissatisfaction could erode the state on their own while the Kurds simply wait out the process .

Despite all of this, there is reason to believe Iraq may continue to muddle along. While the state may be in disarray internally, none of its neighbors want to see it break up. Neither Turkey nor Iran wants to see an independent Kurdish state because of the potential impact on their Kurdish populations. Neither, of course, do the Syrians. The Syrians may not be able to do much about the situation but Iran and Turkey can. Both states have heavily infiltrated the Kurdish autonomous region and could create havoc if their interests were threatened. To the extent Iran helps fight ISIS, their influence over Iraqi internal politics will be significantly enhanced. Turkey also has leverage over the KRG because it is the main destination for Kurdish energy exports. The KRG has tried to build good relations with Turkey so that one day Ankara may not see and independent Kurdistan as a threat. However the relationship between the two has been strained by the fighting in Syria where Ankara has supported the opposition, includingISIS and other Salafi groups that have clashed with Kurds in the eastern part of the country.

The Saudis and the other Sunni states would be equally opposed to the breakup of Iraq. They see Iraq as a fellow member of the Sunni community. Not only would they be opposed to its dissolution on principle, if it were to break up they fear the immediate beneficiary would be Shi’a Iran. From Riyadh’s perspective in particular, things are already going far too much in Iran’s favor.

Given the opposition of Iraq’s neighbors, and the potential for instability, it is difficult to see the US supporting the dismemberment of Iraq either. There may be sympathy for Kurdish independence in Washington, but the US is focused on making a deal with Iran and managing its troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia. It is even harder to see the US going along with idea if there was any possibility that it would allow an Al-Qaeda-like Salafi organization to set up its own state right in the middle of the Levant.

The point being made here is not that Iraq will or will not break up because of what has happened this week. The point is simply that there is no straight line between ISIS’ capture of Mosul and the collapse of the Iraqi state. While this week’s events will leave an indelible mark on Iraqi politics, there are too many unknowns in the equation to make long term predictions. As we should have learned through the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and 80s, and the current civil war in Syria, there is no way to predict what kind of alliances may form or how they may influence the outcome of events. Who knows, ISIS is a threat to the interests of the Americans, the Iranians, the Saudis, the Shi’a, the Kurds, and to moderate Iraqi Sunnis. They have even fallen out with Turkey. Perhaps this crisis will give them common cause to cooperate. Or, not…

 

Reflecting on Ukraine-Russia

A twitter essay:

 

 

 

 

 

Back to Normal Political Instability

Jay Ulfelder (@jay_ulfelderasks if the present level of political instability is the world boiling over or just getting back to normal. I was surprised to see that his answer is the world is getting back to normal. According to Ulfelder, over the last decade, observed (actual) political instability has been noticeably below the predicted level of instability. The drop from 2000 to 2010 looks especially steep.

Which led me to wonder: Why was I surprised? Are the Arab Spring or events in Ukraine having an outsized impact on my perception of the level of political instability? One possibility is that in contrast to a data set that codes all cases of different types of political instability we, and the media upon which we rely, only focus on a few big illustrations.

So we may be significantly below predicted levels of political instability but a few “celebrity” or much-covered examples may distort our perception of the global total. Maybe no matter what you tell me about the relatively low level of political instability in 2011 – both compared to predicted levels for 2011 and to historical annual rates as high as 4% – I will remember the wave of Arab uprisings and the fall of long-time dictators like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.

This does raise a question, as Rex Byrnen noted:

Screen Shot 2014-02-24 at 1.09.03 PM

 

 

 

 

In my mind, our media-influenced perception is actually a weighted perception; we care about or pay attention to some places more than others, a potential explanation for my initial surprise.

A Reply to Kristof: Come Visit My Class at UConn

Dear Mr. Kristof,

I was sad to read your dismissal of political science. While you had a few useful thoughts, much of it was dated and ill-informed. I think you need to learn about political science in 2014.

So please, come to my undergraduate class on recent events in Egypt and Syria. OK, officially it is Contemporary International Politics (POLS 3402). We meet TuTh, 9:30-10:45 am in Storrs, CT. [TuTh is academic jargon for Tuesday & Thursday.] Not far from New York at all. If you email me, I’ll send you the room number.

In this class we discuss political change in Egypt and the war in Syria, real-world events. We read ACTUAL political scientists (and others) who have written in academic journals, blogs, and mainstream publications. We talk about violence, civil war, military intervention, dictatorship, democracy, gender, refugees, and many other issues you would understand without a poli-sci decoder.

I very much look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Prof. Jeremy Pressman

How to stop the Israeli occupation: An answer to Corey Robin

Corey Robin asked the following about the ASA’s recent pro-BDS resolution:

For the last month I’ve been responding to critiques and challenges of BDS. Now I have a question for its opponents and critics. What do you propose as an alternative strategy?

I am not sure I am entitled to answer since I have not written any critique of the ASA resolution, but I think you have to ask a prior question. If you are an American academic association and you want the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank to end, what tactics are most likely to work? (No guarantees; history obviously shows coercion can work for a very long time.)

In others words, what is more effective, the ASA endorsing “a boycott of Israeli academic institutions” or the ASA doing something else? I pick something else.

If I were counseling the ASA, I would suggest the following:

1. You are, I imagine, mostly* residents of the United States. If that is the case, the best thing you can do is lobby the US government to change its policy toward Israel-Palestine. However limited, you have access to US halls of power that a Palestinian in Nablus does not. Change your own government. So pass a resolution condemning current US policy. Write. Call. Visit. Donate. Form a PAC. Organize. Vote.

2. Focus on the denial of academic freedom to Palestinian academics and universities. Work to break it down. Hold conferences and workshops with Palestinian professors. Engage in joint projects. Given the difficult travel policies they face, allocate funds to bring them for scholarly exchanges. I do not know what the MLA will ultimately do, but a draft text I saw went more in this direction. A related variant: formally support Israeli academics who oppose the occupation.

3. Publicize and support on-the-ground Palestinian efforts based on non-violent change. People should know about movements in Bil’in and Budrus and Nabi Salih and Sheik Jarrakh and the like.

Make that list the operative part of the resolution, and the ASA will still get a lot of pushback. But the ASA will also have a better chance of effecting meaningful change.

(For the sake of discussion, I set aside the Middlebury objection. That’s a prior issue the ASA has to address.)

* Please correct me if “mostly” is inaccurate.