Why Is Obama Going to Israel?

Yesterday I tweeted that I was pre-empting speculation and that no, Obama’s coming trip to Israel wasn’t about Iran. It was a response to the conventional wisdom that seems to always assume everything about Israel is about Iran—from last year’s short-lived Likud-Kadima government to the recent elections. But I did receive some pushback on the point, so here’s a fuller accounting of why I made the remark.

It should, though, be obvious that Iran will be near the top of the agenda. It’s a major issue for Israelis, including security officials, and despite the progress made on convergence of their positions, there are still gaps between the American and the Israeli understanding of how to deal with Iran. An Obama trip to the country gives him a direct sense of what the government is thinking and why, which could close some of this distance.

Beyond that, there is the fact that Colin Kahl, who worked for Obama during the election campaign, all but promised during a conference call with the media last July that there would be a visit if Obama was re-elected. Not following through would raise serious questions about Obama himself and his administration at a time when he’s facing all sorts of domestic pressure from pro-Israel Jewish groups and politicians to Republicans.

At the same time, the rest of Obama itinerary provides clues to his motivations. He’ll also be visiting with Palestinian and Jordanian leaders. These countries aren’t important for the confrontation against Iran, but they are for the peace process. Jordan’s domestic problems and its proximity to the Syrian civil war highlight its importance in other ways. In fact, given Israel’s growing concern about the consequences of the breakdown of central authority in Syria, that country is likely to be as high as Iran on the agenda.

The optics count, too. It’s the diplomatic version of smoothing things over and establishing a more personal basis with Benjamin Netanyahu on which to conduct the next four years of policy.

All of this raises the question of timing. In theory Obama could have gone later in the year. But reports are that he is going in March or April. I can think of several reasons.

His new Secretary of State, John Kerry, has already called Israeli and Palestinian leaders to tell them the peace process is one of his priorities. He’ll be visiting the region possibly within the month. An Obama follow-up will underline the importance of the relationship and demonstrate commitment to issues of concern to both countries.

Also, it’s likely that the new Israeli government will have been formed by the time of the visit. The weakening of Likud-Beiteinu and the strengthening of the soft right (Yesh Atid) and the left (Labor, Meretz) have opened up space for a different kind of government than the previous one. Although there is some debate over whether the likely inclusion of Yesh Atid can kick start the peace process, the unexpected priority that the administration has placed on this issue indicates that the president sees this as an opportune moment to remind Israel and Israelis that the US has their back, that peace is necessary for Palestinians and Israelis, and to provide some cover for Netanyahu on this issue against members of his own party, Yisrael Beiteinu, and possibly Jewish Home (if it’s included in the coalition).

Finally, Obama has been stung by accusations that his administration is at best insensitive to Israel and at worst anti-Israel. A visit to Israel is the most effective visible way to counter these attacks. We are constantly reminded by the president’s supporters that only four sitting presidents have ever visited Israel. Joining this small club is an effective way for Obama to address these kinds of domestic and Israeli concerns.

More specifically, the AIPAC conference is scheduled for March 3-5. It’s not clear yet whether Obama will be again speaking to the convention. If he does, he’ll be able to claim not only that he continues to show his commitment to Israeli security through military support, but can demonstrate a personal interest as well—the all-important kishkes factor. And if he’s not speaking at the conference, a visit to Israel is surely the next best thing.

Coordinating against Iran will be an important topic of discussion during Obama’s visit. But the president doesn’t have to travel to Israel for that; his political and defense officials can and do exchange visits with their Israeli counterparts for such purposes. I think, rather, that this convergence of factors explains the motivation and the timing of Obama’s visit.

Who Are the Religious In Israel? Part I

I have been reminded lately that “the religious” in Israel are not always clearly understood—their distinctions, divisions, and politics. But understanding these differences is important, because different groups within this broad social category want different things from the State of Israel. Moreover, considering them to be one large grouping is not helpful for understanding Israel, Israeli politics, or Israeli policymaking; or for comparing to religious groups in other countries.

The most recent Israeli Democracy Index (p.177) captures these differences well. Of self-identification among Israeli Jews, 6% classify themselves as ultra-Orthodox (haredi); 2.2% as Haredi-leumi (Orthodox-nationalist—the convergence between the haredim and the Zionists, sometimes called hardal); 11.8% as Orthodox; 12.7% as Traditional-religious; and 20.7% as Traditional-non-religious. (An additional 45.6% self-identify as secular.)

The traditional categories have been the haredim, the Hasidim,and the religious Zionists. The IDI question mentioned above doesn’t ask specifically about Zionism across this spectrum, but what is commonly called religious Zionism encompasses the Orthodox, the Haredi-leumi, and some portions of the haredi and the Traditional-religious. (Thanks to Dahlia Scheindlin for a clarifying discussion on this.)

The late and very keen observer of Israeli politics, Asher Arian, argued that the politics of the religious parties can be considered along three spectrums: the Zionist dimension (how Zionist), the ethnic dimension (Ashkenazi-Sephardic; indeed, each community has its own rabbinical structures), and the territorial dimension (position regarding the West Bank).

The haredi are sometimes called the ultra-Orthodox (though they reject that term—if you’re Orthodox, you’re already observing the customs and rules of halacha, Jewish law). Conservative in their social norms, they follow a narrow interpretation of Jewish law and scripture. They are further divided into several different sects and denominations, some of which are stricter in their beliefs and practices than others.

In general they are anti- or non-Zionists. Their worldview is categorized into two broad states of being: exile and redemption. Until the Temple is rebuilt and the Jewish people are reconstituted in the Land of Israel, Jews remain in exile. Redemption—a divinely-inspired and –driven process—occurs when these things fall into place. Because of this, some don’t support the state since it was created by human actions.

The haredim are further divided into Hasidic and non-Hasidic groups. Hasidic groups tend to be non-Zionist, though some, like Chabad, do engage in a more practical Zionism that allows for participation in state activities (like serving in the military). There are several different Hasidic groups, each of which operates according to its own dynastic leadership: a main rabbi or small group of rabbis governs the community, apart from the state religious officials.

Haredi politics is complex. Some haredi groups are so completely anti-Zionist and opposed to the state that they don’t recognize it in any way, including through taxes or participation in elections, or by obeying state religious authorities. Their social-political organization, the Edah HaHaredit, works to serve their needs so that the state doesn’t have to. It also maintains its own system of rabbis who look after the community’s spiritual needs. In recent years, the Edah has itself been divided over personality and organizational disagreements.

More extremist in its anti-Zionism is Neteuri Karta—its members are the ones who will meet with Iranian President Ahmadinejad at Holocaust-denial conferences. By some estimates it’s composed only of a few hundred families. It plays virtually no role in Israeli politics, trying to stay apart from the state as much as possible. Its unity, too, has broken down over increasing radicalism among some members

Others are non-Zionist—they don’t actively recognize the validity of the state (or its representatives) but they will recognize the reality of it, and they will participate in its politics. In the current Knesset there are three parties that represent this strain. Shas is the most well-known: it operates according to haredi guidelines but claims to specifically represent the Orthodox and traditional Sephardic community.

The other two parties are Agudat Israel, which is Ashkenazi with some Hasidism, and Degel HaTorah, which is also Ashkenazi but opposed to Hasidism. Despite their tension and bickering, they run in national elections on a single ticket called United Torah Judaism.

The demands of these three parties have always been focused on their own needs: obtaining resources for their community’s social and educational structures. They have successfully played off the secular parties against each other toward this end, offering to serve in a coalition government under one or the other in return for more money and more consideration of their demands.

Sometimes these parties have pressed hard for their secondary goal: to make Jewish law the law of the state. This is represented best by their efforts to enforce a halachic definition of “who is a Jew”—who can immigrate to Israel, who can control conversion processes, and who can dominant personal status issues like marriage. They have been less successful in this arena. The secular parties, sometimes under pressure from diaspora Jews, have resisted most of their efforts and even worked together at times to resist them, though the general trend toward religiosity and the political right in Israel has facilitated greater acceptance of their preferences among the population.

On foreign policy, these parties have been more agnostic than anything else. The major exception is the West Bank. In the past, only the religious Zionists held a strong political and policy position on this subject. After 1967 they pushed hard for settlements across the Green Line, in line with their understanding of the Land of Israel as sovereign Jewish territory. Indeed, the increasing radicalization among the religious Zionist youth has been one of the main drivers of the settlement enterprise.

Most non-Zionists were content to wait for the divine plan to reveal itself, and where they did take positions, this was contingent on other factors. At its beginnings in the 1980s, for example, Shas’s spiritual leader, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, often proclaimed that giving up territory was acceptable for the sake of Jewish lives. His position has changed over time, and it’s not clear what his final ruling will be in the event of a genuine peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Mostly, apart from the staunch anti-Zionists who call for Palestinian rule over the entire Land of Israel, haredi groups have simply mistrusted the Palestinians. Chabad, in particular, has been active in opposing land-for-peace formulae on this basis. Their role in foreign policymaking, then, is limited.

The Orthodox Question

 

As I headed to Israel from the US, I happened to take a United flight that leaves on Saturday afternoon. Because it left before the end of shabbat (the Jewish sabbath) on Saturday evening, the flight was devoid of outwardly observant Jews – no kippot, no long beards, no long black coats. No one held a minyan at the back of the plane.

I found this image particularly striking because it was at odds with something else I had on my mind, Dov Waxman’s recent op-ed in Ha’aretz. Waxman highlighted recent survey data on Jews in NYC that shows Orthodox Jews form an increasing proportion of the New York area’s 1.5 million Jews.

Waxman’s writing was focused upon the Jewish angle. He noted that such a demographic change might mean the end of broad Jewish connections to liberalism and the Democratic party.

I wonder, however, about another dimension of the issue: how the growth of Jewish fundamentalism (for lack of a better word) is embedded within a larger religious turn of the last forty years.  US Christianity has seen the rapid growth of evangelicals (which has its own meaning for the US-Israeli relationship). Hindusim and Islam have also witnessed a return to tradition or, to put it another way, increasing levels of individual observance and piety.

This was hardly expected in the immediate post-WWII era when, some thought, modernity would usher religion into the historical dustbin. Who needs God when we have technology and economic development?

Yet for whatever reason, it turns out many people did want faith (As a refuge from the alienating and isolating aspects of modernity? As part of a search for community? As proof of the resilience of ascriptive characteristics? In response to the failure of economic and social efforts in many countries?) The result has been a global resurgence of religion.

But so what if many religions experienced such a turn? I think it matters because Waxman’s portrayal of Judaism in the future is dependent on the continuation of this trend. However, what if factors beyond Judaism that affect all religions shift and religion writ large changes direction yet again? In other words, I find Waxman’s portrait of the future plausible. I think it is fair to argue it is the most likely scenario. That said, I think it is important to consider the fact that it could be re-directed by global trends of which we are not yet aware.

The Lesson of Ulpana

Today’s Israel news is focused on the failed Knesset bill to legalize the Ulpana neighborhood of Beit El, and thus set a new precedent for all settlement activity in the West Bank.  

There is some sense that Bibi came out on top, because he not only defeated the bill (which appeared to have support within the government coalition and his own party), but also because at the same time he ensured continued support from nationalists by promising to not only move the Ulpana families elsewhere in Beit El, but also to construct new buildings in Ariel, Ma’ale Adumim, Adam, and Kiryat Arba—for a total of 551 new housing units. And that doesn’t include the 300 units Bibi has promised to build elsewhere in Beit El, to make up for the “loss” of Ulpana.

For his part, Amir Mizroch wonders whether this is a pyrrhic victory, since the considerable expansion of settlement activity to offset Ulpana might lead to “a tangle with international legal and diplomatic ramifications.”

I don’t see any contradiction between these two assessments. In fact, I think the lesson of Ulpana is much simpler: that Bibi’s policies are more reactive than anything else.

Although he does believe in the Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel, and that at least parts of the West Bank belong (and will remain) under Israeli sovereignty, Bibi has no real strategic design and, without one, no set of tactical plans to achieve it.

At the same time, Bibi is the consummate politician (whether he is successful as one is another story). He works hard to balance out the multitude of pressures that all Israeli leaders face: external ones from the United States, American Jewry, and the Europeans; internal ones from party and coalition members, voters, and powerful interest groups like the settlement movement.

It’s true that Bibi has matured considerably since his first term as Prime Minister. He doesn’t stumble with his eyes anymore closed into messes like the opening of the Western Wall tunnel in 1996, which led to scores of deaths among Israelis and Palestinians. But given his modus operandi, he cannot exert control over developments in either Israeli domestic or foreign policy. The very act of creating his grand coalition was only to trade the uncertainty of upcoming elections for the certainty of a stable coalition, however long it could last.

Bibi is less a leader than a manager. His task, as he sees it, is simply to balance all these competing forces against each other, reconcile them with his own personal ideology, and remain at the top of the political hierarchy.

Given this, as other neighborhoods are built or expanded in the West Bank (and there is no indication that they won’t be), look for similar compromises to come out of the disputes over them.

Intolerance and Violence in Tel Aviv

Israel has been under attack in recent years on claims that its democracy has been weakened by a perceived resurgence of haredi oppression, and a string of bills and legislative efforts sponsored by right-wing nationalists designed to remove any criticism of the (right wing) government and the settlement enterprise, and to disenfranchise citizens and remove their political and civil freedoms.

I, for one, have argued that things were never dire: that some of these legislative efforts were defeated, that some accounted for the criticisms and were watered down considerably, that some are reflective only of the contemporary context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or that citizens still have ways around these constraints. I have become concerned over Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s lack of effort to rein in some of the more egregious activities of some of his political allies, but still think things are not nearly as bad as many on the left have been insisting. And I still think Bibi has been unfairly targeted as the repository of all that people dislike about Israel, the settlements, the orthodox, and, well, everything else they don’t like.

The disgusting rioting against African migrants last night in Tel Aviv (excellent coverage and discussion of which can be found at +972 Magazine) has demonstrated that the anger, fear, resentment, and inability to accept difference operates at the societal as well as the political level.  

But we need to keep perspective. At Ottomans and Zionists, Michael Koplow reminds us that it was a small number of people at the demonstration-turned-riot, and that the MKs who spoke there were speaking against, not for, the government.

And, as with much of the legislative activity, voices have been heard denouncing both the rioters and the MKs who incited them. This includes the Prime Minister (Bibi) and the Speaker of the Knesset (Reuven Rivlin)—both of whom, it should be noted, belong to the same party as some of the MKs who incited at the protest (Danny Danon, Miri Regev). Already protests against racism in Israel have sprung up in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

But there is still a deeper problem here. It’s not about imposing a hegemonic vision of Zionism (a common explanation) but rather about intolerance—which has perhaps been so obvious that it hasn’t been given the credit it deserves.

This isn’t an Israeli thing or a Zionist thing, it’s a human thing.

There is a group in Israel (and the US) that is intolerant of Others. It is diverse, even fluid. It can consist of the religious or the secular, Ashkenazi or Mizrachi, Russians or Ethiopians, settlers or non-settlers, Israelis or American Jews.

What they have in common, at one time or another, is intolerance of an Other. The intolerant group is amorphous, but it perceives itself to be the real Israel, composed of the real pioneers and defenders of the Zionist dream, against a different and, subsequently, hostile world composed primarily of Gentiles, but also of left wing Israeli and American Jews who (they believe) hate the real Israel. In return, this ingroup feels intolerant of others who do not share its political or ideological agenda.

That’s why Peter Beinart has been attacked personally, for not being a good Zionist or even a good Jew, rather than on the merits of his argument. That’s why left-leaning human rights organizations are attacked as surreptitiously carrying out the instructions of Europeans who dislike Israel. And it’s why members of the Knesset can call African migrants to Israel vile names (“plague”) that evoke horror and disgust but that also suggest a particular method for excising them (violence through incision or operation), and incite a mob to riot against them.

It is not easy to get over one’s intolerance, and in fact much of the work falls to others to help demonstrate why the intolerance is a negative thing. Given this group’s diversity, this is not easy task. One way to do so is to avoid the rhetoric that many have used to describe settlers, trends in Israeli democracy, Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians, its discussions of how to deal with Iran, and so on. Demonization is demonization, whether done in blunt or gentle terms.

This, of course, gets back to the levels of vitriol that characterize the debate over Israel. A reasoned, serious, and civil discussion is absolutely necessary. Obviously it must be done in conjunction with the imposition of law and order, the sanctioning of inciters, and careful policymaking. But it cannot be ignored. The fear- and hate- mongers cannot be allowed to control the conversation—or anything else.

What is Zionism?

At the Times of Israel, I argue that we need to re-think the meaning and future course of Zionism:

On re-invigorating the World Zionist Congress as a genuine place for discussion.

On alternate parameters for discussing Zionism.

On detaching the concept of exile from Zionism, which has relevance for the debate about Israel in the United States and elsewhere.

An exploration of Zionism isn’t only about Israel, but it does have critical relevance for that country and its position in and policies toward the Middle East.

Obama and the Jews

In keeping with Jeremy’s theme of succinct summaries, here’s how American Jews feel about President Barack Obama and how they will vote in 2012:

American Jews don’t like Obama because they don’t feel him in their kishkes.

Jews always vote Democrat.

They don’t like him because he said Israeli-Palestinian negotiations should be based on the 1967 lines (with agreed land swaps).

They like him because he refused to let the Palestinian bid for statehood pass the UN Security Council.

They don’t like him because of what some administration officials have said about democracy in Israel, and Israel as a source for modern anti-Semitism.

They like him because he’s a liberal, and isn’t Santorum, Gingrich, Paul, or Romney.

The Orthodox sector of the Jewish population is opposed to liberal social policies, and given its increasing size in the community (due to high birthrate) will soon come to change Jewish voting patterns.

The younger generation of non-Orthodox Jews is increasingly more likely to be distressed with Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, and therefore care less about either kishkes or popular perceptions of lack of support.

Big Jewish donors are moving away from Obama.

Big Jewish donors are sticking with Obama.

By supporting PIPA and SOPA, Obama is alienating Hollywood—and we all know how many Jews work in Hollywood.

Did I miss anything?

Matching Rhetoric with Expected Outcomes

We all know that the politicians vying for the GOP presidential nomination have gone to extreme, even bizarre, lengths to prove themselves the most pro-Israel candidate (whatever that means), in the process telling Israel and American Jews what is the best medicine for the ailments afflicting Israel. This includes everything from Israeli policy toward settlements in the West Bank, to how to deal with Iran, to how bad Obama and the Democrats are for Israel: see here, here, and here for specifics.

The candidates’ statements, from which they almost never back down but often double down on, are worrisome. They distort the realities and complexities on the ground in Israel; they force Israel (and everything connected to it, such as Iran) to become a wedge issue in American politics, closing off space for careful and nuanced public policy dialogues; they open the door to inane and diversionary debates about the role of the “Israel lobby” in American politics; and they raise serious questions about American policy toward the Middle East should any of them become president or able to influence the president’s foreign policies.

But let’s be careful to put things in perspective. No American president, regardless of which party he comes from, his particular ideology and preferences, or his support in Congress and among the public, has ever been able to shape events on the ground, in the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian arenas.

First, the conflict itself is a multi-party and -factor dynamic, quite simply beyond the control of any one actor.

Second, Republican presidents deemed most supportive of Israel have made decisions at odds with both mainstream American Jewish and Israeli preferences: Ronald Reagan sold advanced military equipment to Saudi Arabia, which AIPAC fought hard against; while George W. Bush pushed Israel to agree to elections in the Palestinian areas in 2006, against Israel’s dire warnings that Hamas would benefit most from them.

Third, it’s not always a good thing for presidents to become so closely involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whatever the form of their involvement. Bill Clinton’s very personal participation at Camp David (2000) failed to produce any agreement, though it does deserve at least some credit for bringing the parties together for a more detailed discussion of their positions than had been done in a long time. But that failure, despite the weight of the presidential office and the prestige of the president himself, helped push Bush away from active involvement in the peace process, which in turn was blamed by many analysts and Arab states for contributing to continued violence and stagnation. In short, there is no magical equation by which presidents can or should determine their level of connection to the conflict.

Finally, it bears repeating that rhetoric and promises made during election campaigns are just as easily forgotten in the midst of the harsh realities of governing. Despite its seeming popularity, the promise to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has never been a priority for any president, Democrat or Republican. The Jerusalem Embassy Act, passed in 1995, requires the move, but allows for the president to waive enactment of the law every six months beginning in October 1998, on the grounds that it would damage US interests in the region. Every president has done so, like clockwork.

It’s obvious by now that we cannot convince the politicians to tone down their rhetoric. But as observers, analysts, and commentators, let’s at least recognize that we cannot assume outcomes directly from that rhetoric.

Are Christian Zionists Replacing Mainstream US Jews?

Spencer Ackerman’s piece on the power of Christian Zionism to replace or supplement American Jewry’s advocacy on Israel has received much attention. But the argument is incomplete; what’s missing is the second part of the story.

Christian Zionists are certainly a potent political force to be reckoned with in the US. And as the longstanding consensus among mainstream Jewry breaks down along new generational, cultural, religious, and political divisions in the community, the Christian Zionists are filling the growing gap left by what was once considered the mainstream Jewish position regarding Israel and US-Israel relations.

However, as a political force their power is facilitated by Israel and by American Jewry itself; on its own, it cannot survive. It needs Jewish Zionism, because without it, Christian Zionism can’t make a sufficiently strong political case.

It is a paradox that the very breakdown in Jewish communal unity toward Israel and US-Israel relations that weakens American Jewry’s ability to influence the foreign policy agenda as much as it used to will also undermine the ability of Christian Zionism to promote its agenda on these issues.

The idea that Israel must or should hold on to all of the West Bank is no longer an obvious if tacit assumption, and hasn’t been since Oslo. It is true that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians seem far off, and both settlers and some Palestinians are calling for a one-state solution. But despite the grim state of peace talks today, the two-state solution is the only one acceptable to everybody and nothing has ever replaced its broad appeal.

But more relevant, within American Jewry, it has become very acceptable to critique Israel in public, and to advocate new lines of advocacy by American Jews. Peter Beinart’s important essay and the emergence of J Street are the most visible signs of this. Beinart’s appearance at various programs among the big Jewish organizations—he recently spoke at the American Jewish Committee’s 2011 Global Forum—indicates how deeply his ideas have penetrated. Even questions about boycotting products from the settlements—inspired by the global BDS movement—have begun to appear legitimate. All of this represents the breaking down of the political advocacy consensus that long held in the community.

At the same time, American Jewry is fragmenting along religious lines, as synagogue are no longer the primary communal institutions they once were and smaller groups of Jews pursue their own self-created religious norms and rituals. And a sure, if not the only, sign of dispersion is the decline in financial support of the major national Jewish organizations.

In short, Christian Zionism is losing its major domestic ally. This is, to be sure, a long and slow process; but it is occurring.

At the same time, Israel has withstood pressure from both the American government and American Jewry on several occasions. There’s nothing to suggest it couldn’t also resist this pressure from Christian Zionists alone. And given that most American policymakers do believe Israel should leave the West Bank (or at least most of it), Christian Zionism’s agenda will have less traction.

It is true that some Republicans, especially among the current field of candidates for the nominee for 2012, indicate they would be open to such an agenda. But the fact that there are many others both within the party and in the broader constellation (see, for instance: Barack Obama) who oppose it means there will be a debate about it, not a blank check.

As America Jewry—apart from the Orthodox—moves center-left, Christian Zionists who lobby on the West Bank will lose their ability to be more Israeli and Jewish than Israel and the Jews.