Back to Normal Political Instability

Jay Ulfelder (@jay_ulfelderasks if the present level of political instability is the world boiling over or just getting back to normal. I was surprised to see that his answer is the world is getting back to normal. According to Ulfelder, over the last decade, observed (actual) political instability has been noticeably below the predicted level of instability. The drop from 2000 to 2010 looks especially steep.

Which led me to wonder: Why was I surprised? Are the Arab Spring or events in Ukraine having an outsized impact on my perception of the level of political instability? One possibility is that in contrast to a data set that codes all cases of different types of political instability we, and the media upon which we rely, only focus on a few big illustrations.

So we may be significantly below predicted levels of political instability but a few “celebrity” or much-covered examples may distort our perception of the global total. Maybe no matter what you tell me about the relatively low level of political instability in 2011 – both compared to predicted levels for 2011 and to historical annual rates as high as 4% – I will remember the wave of Arab uprisings and the fall of long-time dictators like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.

This does raise a question, as Rex Byrnen noted:

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In my mind, our media-influenced perception is actually a weighted perception; we care about or pay attention to some places more than others, a potential explanation for my initial surprise.

Questions on Hamid’s Egypt

Three questions in reaction to Shadi Hamid’s detailed analysis of Morsy and Egypt:

1. “The Brotherhood’s priorities, for now, are rather simple — to survive and get to the next elections.” Won’t that always be the Brotherhood’s priority? In fact, isn’t that the priority of every party in power everywhere?

2. Is Khairat al-Shater a “revolutionary” or “pragmatic”? What does it mean to call him both?

3. How much does it matter what is in the new Egyptian constitution? Would a constitution in Egypt that Islamists liked act as a real constraint on liberals? For the Brotherhood, would it (could it) function as a blueprint for the Islamization of the Egyptian state (and society writ large)?

Syria: Forks in the Road

Marc Lynch’s thoughtful post on how Syria has affected the narrative of the Arab “Spring” had me thinking about what might have been in Syria. I hope scholars eventually will work to address these questions – well, the first four anyway:

1) Had the protests stayed largely peaceful in Syria, would Asad be gone by now?

2) Exactly how much did outside aid for armed rebels undermine non-violent mobilization?

3) Did the Libya model cause elements of the Syrian opposition to put too much emphasis on the idea of external intervention and (wrongly) set their strategy with the expectation that such military intervention would come?

4) If/when Asad falls and if he is replaced by a regime that is not ruling over a fragmented country, acting as a brutal dictatorship, or executing ethnic cleansing, will the Arab Spring narrative shift toward a “positive” direction again?

5) Can we say enough times that “These revolutions…will continue to unfold for many years to come”?

Message to US: Stay out! Rush in!

For years the United States has been pilloried for endless meddling in the Middle East. But now that the Obama administration has been more reticent to get involved, the critique has flipped and staying out is painted as the wrong choice.

Take this headline in the Christian Science Monitor: “Support for jihadists in Syria swells as US backing of rebels falls short.” Though less dramatic than the headline, the article suggests there is a causal relationship, with a “local Aleppo commander” asserting current US policy “has opened the doors for jihadist Islam, not for moderates.”

The argument about Syria is something like this: too few US weapons prolongs the war, allowing Assad to survive for longer. A longer war allows jihadists to flourish in Syria.

As I have written before, I am skeptical of deep US involvement in Syria. I just do not hear supporters of greater military intervention answering the hard questions of how we know it would work out for the best. And given that the dominant meme in the Middle East is about an overbearing American colossus, I am not sure why Washington should be looking for more fuel to feed that fire. It has not worked out so well in the recent past (see al-Qaeda, Iraq, Afghanistan).

Moreover, we could quickly hear a different narrative: anti-US extremists flooded Syria because the post-Assad regime came to power on the back of the United States. Or, chaotic Syria, perhaps with sectarian bloodletting, as a failed state in the heart of the Middle East is fertile ground for extremist training and development. I could be convinced otherwise, but someone is going to have to make – not simply assert – a strong case.

There are, after all, reasons why Syria would be an attractive battleground even if the United States did not exist. A minority regime rules over a Sunni majority. That minority regime is in trouble. Syria has a great geographic location for serving as base for influencing and interfering in other countries.

Extremists surely see this as an opportunity after decades of hostile, repressive rule in Damascus. US policy be damned, I expect they would have given it a go.

If the United States had a pathway to a stable, post-Assad order, maybe that would help. I don’t see it, at least not yet. Do you?

A New Purpose for Turkish Foreign Policy?

For a short period of time, Turkey appeared to many to be a model for the rest of the Middle East. It’s “zero problems” foreign policy had warmed relations with its Arab and Iranian neighbors, the Kurdish opening was putting to rest concerns over its own democratic credentials, and its economy was growing fantastically.

I’ve argued before that the Turkish model was always over-stated and less applicable to the Arab states than assumed. And not surprisingly, Ankara has been struggling to find a coherent foreign policy framework since the collapse of strong relations with Israel, the Arab Awakening, and the renewed emphasis on Iran’s nuclear program.

Under these circumstances, any country would have a hard time constructing a clear regional strategy. It hasn’t helped that Turkey’s Prime Minister has been reactive rather than proactive. Growing concerns about the economy, the repression of Kurdish activists in conjunction with a more violent response to re-emerging PKK attacks, and the suppression of media criticism and other human rights violations have exacerbated these weaknesses.

Still, the continuing uncertainty of the Arab Awakening has provided Turkey with an opening to refocus its foreign policy, provided it can resist outsized rhetoric and adopt realistic policies that account for the difficulties of existing conditions. In particular, Turkey can play a leadership role in working to stabilize emergent systems and play a role in post-regime transitions.

The first instance was Turkey’s role in Libya. After some hesitation and uncertainty, Ankara worked quickly to establish good relations with the Transitional National Council and help shepherd it into power. It provided about $300 million in aid to the TNC at a crucial moment at its origins and worked to unfreeze around $3 billion in Libyan assets for the rebels to use. It also hosted a meeting of the Libya Contact Group, putting itself near the center of political and diplomatic efforts in the country.

Now in Syria it has been working to find an acceptable new government in preparation for the moment when the Asad regime is overthrown. In the spring it hosted the Friends of Syria, an international meeting convened to deal with the Syrian civil war. Most dramatically, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu has now called for Syria’s Vice President, Farouk Sharaa, to lead a transitional government once Bashir Asad is gone.

Sharaa is no outsider, and his credibility is questionable. It’s also not clear that the Syrian opposition trusts or wants him (though there are now reports that it would consider him). But at least Turkey is working to take on a greater role in preparing for what comes next.

The Syrian opposition remains fragmented and many potential problems are obvious. And at the regional level it’s too early to call this a new trend in Turkish foreign policy. It’s also not clear how many more similar opportunities will be available.

But I think Ankara is finally doing what I’ve argued it needed to do a long time ago: work constructively within existing conditions to prepare for what comes after regimes are removed, and adopt a less aggressive leadership role while recognizing its limitations under existing conditions. It’s also a smart move because it compensates for Turkey’s reluctance to intervene more directly in the Syrian civil war, and for its less than sympathetic treatment of Syrian refugees. And the credibility Turkey creates with the new governments provides many post-Asad benefits, including economic, political, and security ones.

Turkey is starting to deal with its own political problems, particularly as the AKP prepares for some kind of leadership transition, and this could prove distracting to its foreign policy. But hopefully Turkey has learned from its past mistakes and will continue its regional efforts along a clearly laid out framework.

America In or Out of the Middle East?

Michael Cohen (at Foreign Policy) and Matt Duss (at the American Prospect) have pieces out today that capture well the dilemma the United States faces in the Middle East. Both reference the newly-emerging political systems in several regional countries, and note the problems these democratic (or part-democratic) systems pose for Washington’s ability to manage, much less control, events there.

Both also appropriately note that American analysts too often perceive of regional events, and America’s abilities and interests there, only in terms of “us” (Michael’s word), without considering the agency and actions of local actors. Their big difference appears to be in that Michael considers the US more “impotent” in the region than not, forcing it “to try and shape events around the margins,” while Matt believes the US can play a bigger role in shaping outcomes, just a very different one from the past (by “model[ing] liberal democratic practices”).

I certainly agree that it makes no sense to think the US can control events in the region; the historical record, as I’ve argued before, demonstrates that Washington’s ability to achieve outcomes there is conditioned on the decisions and willingness of regional actors.

And it’s also certainly true that changes in both the Middle East and in the world as a whole are creating new dynamics in which the United States will be more constrained in its ability to do what it wants, however slowly this might happen.

In the Middle East it’s obvious that Washington’s leadership is highly constrained: Israel under a rightwing government views its foreign policies through a very narrow lens, often ignoring American and world concerns and pressures. (For the record, this was a pattern already evident before Benjamin Netanyahu came to power a second time.) The Arab states whose authoritarian regimes have been toppled or made more inclusive have to worry about their own internal politics, while the regimes that remain in place have to worry about their own security and power. Iran hasn’t given any indication of a readiness to engage with the US (and by extension, Israel) in a constructive manner. And a host of inter- and intra-state conflicts and challenges continue to wrack much of the region, some more violent and problematic than others.

But I’m not convinced the US is as helpless as many have indicated. I’m not sure Michael or Matt would use that term to describe Washington in the Middle East, but one gets the sense that the sheer ambiguity of regional developments and inability to predict even the near future in the region causes considerable doubt among many.

The international system remains an American-centric one: as some institutionalists argue, the world’s main security, political, and economic structures were constructed by the US, and continue to run on American support in one way or another. Everybody still expects the US to exercise leadership.

The problem is that that leadership has been timid, ill-informed, and hostage to the vagaries of domestic American politics. These conditions downplay a more forceful American foreign policy in favor of a more reactive one, which is one in which the US loses the ability to protect its interests and position.

At the same time, many analysts have been telling Washington that it needs to work in tandem or directly with the democratic forces at play in the Arab world (though there seems to be less interest in Israel’s own democratic structure and a blind spot regarding flaws in Turkey’s democracy). Of course the US should encourage democracy in the region—it would be morally obtuse to expect it of ourselves but think it’s not relevant for others.

But these arguments often portray a choice for the US as one between this reactive, “gentler” policy and a more militarized and militant one in which force is the appropriate instrument. This is a false dichotomy, and again, it diminishes the agency that the US can exert on its own behalf.

It might be ironic that Obama has been demonstrating some of this needed resolve toward Israel. But even here, more American assertiveness is needed, particularly on the more difficult issue of the peace process. It’s become, since the George W. Bush presidency, a negative thing to talk about the US throwing its weight around. It certainly can be a negative thing (for example, when the argument is that the US needs to invade more countries), but it doesn’t have to be.

The global institutions are in place for the US to exert a much more vigorous role in working to manage successful transitions to peaceful, democratic, and prosperous systems around the world; to manage threats to global peace and security; and to push friends, allies, and others to resolve their conflicts without violence. It certainly can’t do all or any of this on its own, and our expectations should be tempered; but the US needs to start trying harder toward such ends.

Morris, Koplow, and Israel’s Security Today: Ideology vs. Capabilities

Michael Koplow and Benny Morris come to opposite conclusions about how the Arab “Spring” affects Israel’s national security. Why? Because Koplow rightly privileges economic and military capabilities while Morris turns to ideology as the master variable.

Koplow concludes that, “the states on Israel’s borders [are] content to let the status quo remain despite the upheaval in their internal politics.” Yet Morris explains, change in the Arab world “represents a dramatic, abrupt tightening of the noose.” Moreover, “The lynchpin of the siege, offering the most palpable and immediate threat to Israel, is of course Iran…”

A central argument for Koplow is that neighboring Arab states lack resources to launch a war. Serious economic difficulties make war with Israel less likely. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria lack the resources to fund a war. Egypt and Jordan would further worsen their economic situation with the resultant loss of U.S. aid.

Not only do these states lack their own resources but they also lack an external patron. There is no Soviet Union to counter-balance Israel’s superpower ally in Washington.

Contrast that with Morris’s piece. The coming to power of Islamists in Egypt, their growth in Jordan, and their likely victory in Syria spells trouble for Israel. They reject Israel and will act militarily consistent with their anti-Israel beliefs.

For Morris, then, ideology is paramount. Islamism’s general hostility toward Israel is determinative. Islamism is so powerful that Morris would say Islamists would willfully ignore the huge imbalance in forces and economic risks and try to take on Israel anyway on the battlefield. His enemy is monolithic and irrational.

In terms of how the world works, I am much more sympathetic to Koplow in this case. I tend to be skeptical of putting too much emphasis on culture, ideology, and religion.

Historically, perhaps Morris would point to Israel-Hamas or Israel-Hizbollah battles to prove his point. Yet both are more like non-state actors than governments. The fact that they have often been deterred from attacking Israel even in smaller doses (e.g. rockets) and have never launched a conventional offensive says a lot about the importance of capabilities and balance of forces even with a hostile ideology.

Meanwhile, no neighboring Arab state has moved air and ground forces against Israel since 1973. That is curiously absent from Morris’s stylized Arab-Israeli history. For the most recent 60% of Israel’s history (1973-2012), it has faced serious violence but not a conventional military attack.

If Islamist politicians take full control in Egypt (roadblock: the armed forces), Jordan (roadblock: the monarchy), or Syria (roadblock: Asad regime), we may get a better test of the Morris-Koplow disagreement. Until then, I’m with Koplow.

Tomorrow Israel Won’t Be Thinking About the Palestinians

Israelis will not be thinking very much about the West Bank, the settlements, the Palestinians, or the peace process in the near future. Short of major changes in conditions, none of these will occupy the attention of Israelis.

It is not a new or startling conclusion, but it is reinforced by the panels and discussions here at the Presidential Conference in Israel. This is all the more telling given this year’s theme of “Tomorrow”–a consideration of what the near future holds for Israel.

I attended a good panel on the future of the tent protests in Israel. Chaired by journalist Orly Vilnai, it was composed of Tamar Hermann (who writes on Israeli public opinion), Daphni Leef and Itzik Shmuli (two of the young leaders of the social protest movement), and Avi Simhon (who was on the Trajtenberg committee that examined the protests and made recommendations to the government on how to address its concerns).

It was a very passionate and exciting panel. But the emotions were focused on how to proceed from here, and how the government is and should be reacting. The Palestinians and the peace process weren’t mentioned until near the end, when Leef was asked about this issue’s place in the protests.

Her response was telling. She said she was the wrong person to ask about the issue, and that you couldn’t fault the protestors for coming out in support of the particular issues they did. In one of the more poignant statements of the conference, she said people came out thinking “only of their pain.” Given the demands of the protestors, it seems reasonable if not obvious to conclude that this refers to the rising cost of living, wealth disparity, and so on–the things that directly affect the average citizen. The settlements or Palestinians do not.

Hermann provided broader context. Despite the passion surrounding the tent protests, the majority of Israelis are satisfied and content. They see, she said, how bad things are in other countries. And they see what they have here. Moreover, the middle class simply isn’t ready to take up the cause of the social protests (or, it seems obvious, the peace process and the occupation). They are afraid to rock the boat, and without them, change isn’t going to happen.

Hermann also defended the importance of politicians being involved in thinking how to change socio-economic conditions, noting that it is a political issue that will have to be dealt with at that level. As has been said many times already, in the political arena the occupation is even less popular as an issue for action or holds less interest than the social protests.

Few of the other panels dealt with or are scheduled to deal with the Palestinians. There are sessions on the future of Israel’s borders, and of the Arab Spring’s impact on Israel, and general ones on how Israel should think about the future. But for a conference built around the issues of the future, there is remarkably little–apart from the by now seemingly obligatory statements on the importance of the peace process here and there–discussion focused on the peace process and its components.

For good or ill, it doesn’t bode well for any change in that sphere.

Normalizing American-Turkish Relations

Last night, before I read the Council on Foreign Relations’ Task Force report on US-Turkey relations, I had a lengthy Twitter conversation with Michael Koplow, Steven Cook (the director of the report), and Laura Rozen. It turns out I agree with much of the report’s recommendations; but in some ways I don’t think it goes far enough.

Koplow is right to warn that the US should be careful about tying its interests and policies too closely to Turkey. But I think the American-Turkish relationship can be made stronger, and closer, without letting Ankara drag Washington along to places it would rather not go.

Turkey and the US have a long history of tense moments in their relationship, and it would be fair to say that most of them involved American insensitivities to Turkish interests. In the 1960s it was over Cyprus (particularly US President Lyndon Johnson’s outright threat that he would not defend Turkey from the Soviet Union over the island) and Turkish poppy production (which the US wanted banned). In the 1970s it was again Cyprus, lack of US diplomatic support, an American arms embargo, and consistent criticism over Turkey’s domestic policies.

The 1980s were better, but the end of the Cold War and bipolarity in the early 1990s prompted many in the US to question whether Turkey (like Israel) was still a strategic asset. Such questions were soon put to rest with the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis and war, and the turn by many US analysts to recognizing Turkey’s regional importance.

This turn was the beginning of a series of regular “discoveries” of Turkey’s importance. Located in the middle of several strategically important and/or volatile regions, Ankara was argued to be key to US and Western policy. Simon Mayall, writing in 1997 for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, best represents this view:

[i]n a bipolar world Turkey had had the luxury of an uncomplicated security policy in which, broadly speaking, it aligned with the West, opposed the Soviet Union, and ignored the rest….In the new security environment, Turkey’s geographical position and its military strength now made it a European, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Near Eastern, Caucasian, Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea power. Sharing borders with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Turkey’s control of the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardenelles also made it a Black Sea neighbor of Russia, the Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. Turkey’s ethnic roots lay in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, influencing its interests, concerns, and sympathies. Its Muslim identity demanded a community of interest in the Middle East, through Pakistan, and across to South East Asia. None of the immediate and demanding post-Cold War issues of Bosnia, the Middle East Peace Process, Iraqi sanctions, Operation Provide Comfort, Trans-Caucasus separatism, Russian activities in the ‘Near Abroad,’ CFE flank issues, NATO enlargement, Cyprus, Central Asia, and energy pipelines could be discussed without reference to Turkey.

Today, some of these issues have passed from importance, and others have been resolved. But think of how we might replace those that have with: Iran, the Arab Spring, Afghanistan, Syria. Add in Turkey’s growing economic strength, a dynamic AKP government, and concerns over a decline in US influence in the Middle East, and Turkey remains no more or less important to US interests and policy than when it was so discovered to be in the 1990s.

My point is not that Turkey shouldn’t be considered relevant: it clearly is. Instead, I would argue that the American-Turkish relationship needs to be normalized. Rather than regularly highlighting its position and what it can do for US interests, make the relationship like the American-British one: treat Turkey like a brother, not the strange cousin we invite for supper every once in awhile. Don’t speak of its indispensability every few years; make it a standard assumption.

Ties should be strengthened, in the manner set out in the CFR report. But these should be routinized, made mundane. Not only will this enhance the American-Turkish relationship, by creating a set of expectations and norms on both sides; it will also help reduce the over-heated rhetoric coming from US analysts and Turkish columnists and politicians that we heard in the 1990s and in the wake of the Arab Spring. These create false expectations, and subsequent disappointment, and waste time.

A normalized relationship will help sensitize Washington to Turkey’s needs and interests, particularly while Turks themselves figure out their foreign policy directions. It will allow the US to call upon Turkey when it needs to, without having to make it seem like a major favor. And it will construct an underlying, stabilizing platform in the relationship—and by extension in other arenas, like NATO and Europe.

The benefits for Turkey are clear: a healthy, stable relationship with the world’s most powerful country; a status as an understandable “regular” country among more American policymakers and the public (this is, in my view, one of the most critical recommendations of the CFR report); and the ability to disagree with friends over differences of opinion without having to suffer a negative backlash.

Clearly the two countries will continue to disagree over issues, and—again, similar to Israel—there will be different expectations given their different locations and positions in the international system. Canada and the US have had severe disagreements over issues (softwood lumber, Iraq), but that relationship remains strong and healthy. Much work remains to be done, on both sides; but it’s certainly a goal worth pursuing.