Doves in Israel’s Security Network?

Yesterday, Israel’s outgoing National Security Advisor, Yaakov Amidror, said that if peace talks with the Palestinians fail, Israel’s international standing will worsen. Though he didn’t lay it out specifically, the logical extension of his argument is that the talks need to succeed if Israel is to be in a stronger regional and global position; and to succeed, Jerusalem will need to take them more seriously and be prepared to offer serious concessions.

Amidror is no lefty. He is a member of the religious Zionist community, which believes that the Land of Israel was given to the Jews by God, and therefore should not—indeed, cannot—be given up to an independent Palestinian state. But his comments reflect similar comments made by many, many former security officials once they’ve left their work in the military and intelligence communities. Out of office, they’ve all publicly mused—and some have been downright accusatory—about whether Israel’s policy toward the West Bank and settlements is creating unnecessary threats and leading Israel into moral corruption and physical danger.

• Former Chief of Staff Ehud Barak said that without a Palestinian state, Israel risked becoming an apartheid regime.

• Former Mossad head Meir Dagan argued that Israel’s needs to present a viable peace initiative, and that the Netanyahu government isn’t doing so.

• Former Mossad head Efraim Halevy has criticized Israel’s insistence that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state as a non-starter.

• And, of course, there are the highly critical comments by all of the living former chiefs of the Shin Bet.

These are only the most recent prominent examples. Before them, there was Shimon Peres (a notable hawk during his time in the Defense Ministry), Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Amram Mitzna, and others.

What gives? Do all these hard men, who have engaged in deception and violence during their careers, suddenly become soft and dovish out of office? Is there something about being a member of the security network that makes one a dove?

The short answer is “no.” But the long answer is “yes.”

To some extent it’s about personality and individual beliefs. Plenty of former security officials have become rightwing politicians: Rechavam Ze’evi joined Moledet and Rafael Eitan founded Tzomet, both far-right political parties. Effi Eitam joined the protests at the settlement of Amona in 2006, which tried to prevent the Israel Defense Forces from demolishing the buildings in accordance with government policy. Moshe Ya’alon became the pro-settlement Likudnik and current Defense Minister.

But there are also some structural and bureaucratic forces at play here that “hide” what are widely considered leftwing views among security officials while they are active, so that by the time they are able to speak publicly and freely it seems as though they have been “converted” to leftist ideology.

I’d argue that being privy to all kinds of detailed information about threats, challenges, and enemies’ intentions and capabilities certainly makes these security officials aware of the problem, but also aware that a range of policies is needed to both lessen the burden on the military/security forces as the primary or only units able to respond to these particular policy problems, and to undermine the ability of enemies and challengers to expand operations, gain supporters, and weaken Israel in the broader regional and global structures.

In other words, these officials understand that serious peace initiatives by Israel and an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank-Gaza are important policies that need to be pursued and have a good chance of diminishing threats to Israel.

Outside observers, though, don’t realize that many security chiefs might already be thinking these are necessary responses while they are on active duty because they aren’t going to publicly call out the government of Israel for not trying (or at least, most officials won’t do that). Thus working in agencies by nature secretive (like intelligence and defense) doesn’t allow for a comparison of their views during and after their service.

At the same time, there is the question why these officials cannot make such policies happen, if they really are convinced these are valid policy options. Part of it has to do with the nature of security decision-making in Israel, which—like in other states—is such that agencies often have to struggle for resources, attention, and influence. They have less ability to focus on already-difficult policy options when the process of decision-making takes up so much time.

There is also, of course, the nature of civilian leadership and the seeming lack of commitment to a serious peace process. This isn’t a Bibi thing, though many critics like to hold him accountable for the problem today. All civilian governments since before Bibi have had a difficult time moving forward on the peace process, including, in recent years, under Labor and Kadima governments.

Finally, I think there’s a process of prioritization that pushes serious efforts at peace to a secondary or subordinate position to more immediate physical-military threats to Israel. These security officials are the individuals responsible for the frontline defense of Israel; failure to protect Israel will result in the killing of Israeli citizens and the weakening of Israel’s borders and defenses. It seems likely that compared to negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, which has its own host of issues and problems, figuring out how to undermine terrorist organizations, defend against missiles, or disrupt enemies’ military capabilities are much “easier,” producing quicker and more obvious results.

Only after they leave active service might these officials have the breathing space to look back and wonder if they—and the country itself—have missed an opportunity to take a longer view.

Yes, Israelis Are Open to a Palestinian State

Writing in Mondoweiss, Alex Kane argues that, based on the most recent poll by the Israel Democracy Institute, Israelis don’t actually want a two-state solution—contrary to a slew of previous surveys—because their version of a Palestinian state is so truncated and unviable that it’s not acceptable to Palestinians. He concludes that “Israeli society is too wedded to the continuing colonization of Palestine for a Palestinian state to come into being.”

Kane raises a fair point—that Israelis aren’t clamoring to leave the entire West Bank in return for a Palestinian state on the entire territory—but his argument rests on several presumptions that I don’t think can be taken as indicative of Israelis’ or Israel’s final position on a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

First, Kane assumes that public opinion polls determine outcomes. The general findings are that, in democracies, public opinion sets parameters rather than makes specific government policies, particularly in foreign affairs. This isn’t to say that governments can’t ever make policy with which the public disagrees; or that public opinion can’t constrain governments. But this general historical pattern, and indeed the specific historical pattern in Israel, indicates that if the Israeli public broadly and consistently supports peace with the Palestinians, which I think even Kane agrees is demonstrated in polling, then the government has the space to move forward on the peace process.

Kane draws a straight line from public opinion surveys to the specifics of a deal. But that’s not what public opinion is used for, nor how it’s properly understood. In some areas, for example, surveys on how people will likely vote, public opinion polls can be fairly accurate. But this is less so on critical foreign policy issues. It’s not the Israeli public that will determine the specifics of a deal. No-one has ever said getting to a final agreement would be simple, but we have plenty of previous official negotiations and track two efforts that show what Kane is concerned about may not be unbreachable obstacles when Israeli and Palestinian negotiators get close to the endgame. There’s nothing to support the conclusion that the Israelis will get everything they want, as expressed in the recent Israel Democracy Institute poll that Kane builds his case on; the negotiators themselves have said that “all issues” are on the table.

Second, Kane specifically mentions Ariel and Ma’ale Adumim as stumbling blocks, because most polls indicate Israelis want to keep them. They will probably prove to be two of the settlements over which negotiators will fight most. But that doesn’t translate into an inevitable inability to resolve the issue. If Israel keeps them, it might well be that Palestinians will be compensated for them through land swaps and a complex arrangement of corridors and alternate routes to Jerusalem and around the West Bank.

Third, Kane mentions the demilitarized nature of a Palestinian state as something likely to block an agreement. I’m not sure why this should be considered more of sticking point than Jerusalem or the right of return, but there isn’t anything to suggest that “demilitarized” can’t be finessed in talks. It might be a temporary Israeli or international military presence in the Jordan Valley; it might mean a defense treaty between Israel and Palestine giving the former the right to send soldiers through the latter’s territory to fend off a threat from the east; it might be a well-armed Palestinian police force but no military. It could mean many things—especially because there is a growing understanding in Israel that the Jordan Valley isn’t as necessary for Israel’s security as it once was. But being demilitarized isn’t something that will make or break a final agreement, nor is it the sin qua non for Palestinian statehood.

Fourth, the details of each poll that Kane references are important. At +972 Dahlia Scheindlin has a sharp and careful analysis of Israeli polls on peace talks. She points out there are real differences in the types of questions asked, and therefore the specific conclusions that commentators can draw from a single poll or question. Given these differences, it’s clear that there is considerable room to maneuver in negotiations, which gets back to my first point above. I highly recommend reading her piece in full.

Finally, Kane switches arguments to contend that Benjamin Netanyahu is not the leader to bring Israel into a final agreement. That’s probably where I agree most closely with him. I’ve argued that I’m skeptical Bibi will be the one to sign a final agreement. Maybe he will, but even if he doesn’t, a genuine process under Bibi will help maintain a positive atmosphere for continued negotiations under his successor. (I’m not suggesting the process continue for its own sake; I’m speaking of a serious set of talks.)

Even more importantly, the historical pattern favors Bibi. All of Israel’s prime ministers who engaged in talks with the Palestinians were hawks, all hardline in their own way. In his first term as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin refused to consider the PLO a serious negotiating partner; as late as January 1993 he rejected direct talks with the organization. Yet he signed the Declaration of Principles and accepted in private the likelihood of a Palestinian state run by the PLO. Ehud Barak as Chief of Staff expressed considerable reservations about the Oslo Accords and as a politician abstained from the Knesset vote on Oslo II; yet at Camp David and Taba he broke longstanding Israeli taboos on final status issues. Ariel Sharon once said that “the fate of Netzarim [in Gaza] will be the fate of Tel Aviv”; in summer 2005 he withdrew all Israeli civilians and soldiers from the Strip. And Ehud Olmert was once considered a hardline rightist opposed to a Palestinian state; he now regularly talks about the coming division of Jerusalem.

What I’m saying is that the public declaration of leaders are important and need to be accounted for, but they aren’t necessarily the final determinant of their actual policies. The four prime ministers before Netanyahu are proof of this, while Bibi himself has been softening his own position on a Palestinian state. This is not to say that these Israeli leaders suddenly began to read from Mahmoud Abbas’s script; and clearly there were still gaps between their opening positions in negotiations and a fair, just solution for both peoples. But the difference between their previous statements and their later positions also cannot be ignored; it’s for sustained negotiation to bridge that gap.

If we want to look at Israeli public opinion and historical patterns, as Kane does, then they are at worst ambivalent about outcomes and dependent on conditions, and at best give concrete reasons why we can remain optimistic and hopeful for real change.

Blaming Shelly Yacimovich

Uri Misgav has written a scathing post taking apart Shelly Yacimovich’s leadership of Israel’s Labor Party. He raises a number of good points, but I think he’s also a little unfair to her. But most important, I think he mistakes Yacimovich’s problems at the helm for problems in party itself. Put another way, if Labor—and Laborites—commit to some serious changes, Yacimovich’s “faults” will appear less tragic and self-induced.

Misgav starts off criticizing Yacimovich for wanting to move the party’s primaries up in order to avoid potential competition from potentially attractive candidates like Gabi Ashkenazi. By doing so he seems to want to tar her with an unprecedented cynicism and lust for power—as though all of Labor’s leaders were not driven by the same motivations.

But consider what the party’s most recent leaders have done. Ehud Barak literally broke the party up so he could remain in government. Amir Peretz and Amram Mitzna abandoned the party when they couldn’t get everything they wanted and went over to Tzipi Livni’s center-right party, where they thought they’d have more influence. Shimon Peres, too, left the party to join Ariel Sharon’s center-right Kadima. Does it sound like Yacimovich is doing anything out of the ordinary?

Misgav then critiques Yacimovich’s decisions during the recent electoral campaign, faulting her for Labor’s meager improvement of only two seats out of what he calculates to be 32 up for grabs. As I’ve argued before, not all of Labor’s less-than-stellar results are Yacimovich’s fault.

Importantly, I’m not sure that Mizgav’s assumption of 32 seats available to Labor is accurate under the conditions of the election. The appearance of Hatnua and Yesh Atid were beyond Yacimovich’s control, and the Israeli public likes to throw some votes to third parties, at least for a single election.

In addition, polling data told the party that the public was simply less interested in talking about the conflict with the Palestinians or the settlements; their top concerns were domestic social and economic problems. While talking mostly about these matters, she also reinvigorated the party by bringing in new candidates who were known to be focused on these issues. But I do agree with Misgav that Yacimovich’s mistake on this issue was, when she became willing to talk about it, to try to seem more rightwing than Labor has been in recent years in order to siphon off potential Yesh Atid and then Hatnua voters. It’s not clear how convincing she could be, and she lost some leftwing voters who were turned off by her seeming turn to the center-right.

In short, it’s not Yacimovich that is the problem here, but the party’s internal laws that threaten a leader so soon after elections. And it’s the fault of its top politicians who always see themselves as the more competent, even rightful, leader of the party.

Labor’s power has been in decline for many years, and it’s simply not realistic to expect one person to change all of that around over the course of one election. What the party needs is a long period of unity so that it can work on expanding its grassroots organization, craft a clear and consistent message to the Israeli public, and accept its leader’s right to remain in the position for a significant period of time. Until that happens, Laborites and pundits will continue to blame the leader for the party’s deeper problems.

Working with Bibi

My piece in Open Zion yesterday argued that, although he’s not actively interested in withdrawing from the West Bank and helping create a Palestinian state in the entire WB, Benjamin Netanyahu is the Prime Minister of Israel, and so needs to be worked with. Moreover, he’s a pragmatist and opportunist; he can be pushed toward that end.

Follow the link for more.

Israel’s New Defense Minister Ain’t Ehud Barak

With the new coalition about to be put in place, the Defense Ministry will go to Likud’s Moshe “Bogie” Ya’alon, the former Minister of Strategic Affairs. In the past I argued that Ehud Barak would be missed as Israel’s Defense Minister, because of the restraint he could exercise on both Iran and settlements. Ben Caspit argues that Ya’alon is moderate, thoughtful, and careful. But I’m skeptical. His recent statements on Iran and the peace process (including the settlements and a Palestinian state) seem more in line with Benjamin Netanyahu, or even more with the hardliners in the party.

On Iran, Ya’alon believes—like most Israeli leaders—that it is the major strategic threat to the country. But where Barak viewed the use of force (against Iran or the Palestinians) as part of a larger foreign policy tool kit, Ya’alon seems bent on a military strike against Iran—sooner rather than later—to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. He’s said that “The best defense is a good offense.” And he seems to have a less positive view of President Obama’s support for the Israeli position than Barak did, which could cause problems for coordination between Israel and the United States.

On the peace process, Ya’alon is more in line with Netanyahu’s “there is no Palestinian partner” argument, particularly when it comes to the demand to recognize Israel as the Jewish state. Indeed, this past January he ruled out any possibility of a Palestinian state.

Ya’alon is also less interested in the open exchange of ideas and criticism. When he attended a Jewish Leadership conference (a far-right faction within Likud whose head, Moshe Feiglin, advocates for the construction of a Third Temple), he called Peace Now a “virus” and continued that “Jews can and need to live in all of the Land of Israel for all eternity.”

Certainly Barak was no Peace Now member: he authorized “illegal settlements” and allowed his ministry, and the IDF, to facilitate the expansion of “legal” settlements and violent attacks by settlers against Palestinians and their property. But he wasn’t an unrestrained Greater Israel advocate either. This seems to have angered Ya’alon, who once called for Barak’s authority to determine settlements (which belongs to the Defense Minister) to be stripped away and given to others.

All of these hard-right positions will be amplified in the new government, because Ya’alon is not a serious contender for power either in Likud or in government. He can be counted on to support Netanyahu’s policies on the peace process and Iran, and because Bibi doesn’t view him as a threat he’ll be brought in to reinforce Bibi against Yair Lapid and Tzipi Livni.

As I said before, we’ll soon miss Barak.

More Flawed than Normal?

The Israeli electoral and party systems have long been broken. Political parties were always breaking apart and merging—indeed, both Labor and Likud are themselves amalgamations of several factions, some of which have over time left the party and then returned to it. Up until the late 1990s it still functioned relatively well.

But this year’s election process seems more flawed than usual. Or maybe it’s because the process is more exposed than usual. Tzipi Livni, for instance, has been making political announcements on her Facebook page since she left Kadima. And there are a number of really good Israeli journalists tweeting from virtually every public meeting the parties have been holding.

First, the center/center-left is far more fragmented than ever before. It makes no electoral sense for there to be a Labor, a Tzipi Livni Party, a Yesh Atid, and a Kadima. It’s true that in the past there have been several parties clumped on a particular spot on the political spectrum. What’s different this time is that none of these parties show any sign of willingness to work closely with each other. Worse, they’ve all given indications that they’ll jump into a government with Bibi and Likud at the first opportunity.

Second, the sheer ego that’s been driving the electoral process is more staggering than normal. Individuals have been forming and leaving parties seemingly on a whim. Tzipi Livni didn’t want to play second fiddle to anybody else, so she formed a brand new party named after her. Yair Lapid didn’t want to be in second place either, so he, too, formed his own party.

Ehud Barak abandoned the party he specifically formed to enter government because he couldn’t handle the embarrassment of staying with it to the bitter end. Amir Peretz sulked because he was at number three in Labor and couldn’t get Shelly Yachimovich to give in to his demands, so he left the party he had once led and went to Livni.

Haim Amsalem was kicked out of Shas for dissenting from the party’s rabbinical line, and formed Am Shalem. Michael Ben Ari and Aryeh Eldad didn’t like the new leadership in National Union, so they left to form Strong Israel.

If the stakes for Israelis and Palestinians weren’t so high, this would make for a good drama—or comedy. (Michael Koplow appropriately compared Israeli politics to an HBO series.)

But weighty issues remain to be adequately dealt with. Hamas and Hezbollah are clearly much stronger than ever before; relations with Turkey and Egypt are persistently stagnant, with no sign of potential improvement any time soon; the Iranian nuclear question is coming to a head within the next six to 12 months; the Syrian endgame looks to be here; and the recognition of Palestine as a non-member state at the UN is raising new questions about political and legal maneuvers and putting renewed emphasis on Israeli policies toward the West Bank.

Israel is distracted from dealing with these issues because parties and politicians are busy fighting for what they see as their rightful share of the political pie. The saddest part of it all is that the outcome of the elections is unlikely to change things all that much. The right is likely to still get between 65 and 68 seats, or more (the most recent poll gives it 73 Knesset seats—though I should repeat that I’m not convinced “left” and “right” are necessarily helpful categories). Bibi will probably still be prime minister. And, as I said, most parties would join Bibi’s coalition if they could—except the Arab parties (which won’t be asked) and Meretz (which seems most likely to stand more on principle than any other party).

The silver lining is that the electoral lists are now set, by law. We’ll see less overt and public plotting and scheming…at least until January 23.

Ehud Barak As Tactician, Not Politician

At Open Zion I argue that Ehud Barak really is necessary to have in the Israeli government. The full piece is reprinted below.

Daniel Gavron has responded to my contention, here on Open Zion, that Benjamin Netanyahu should try to keep Ehud Barak at the Defense Ministry because he’ll be a restraining force on some of the more hawkish members of the new government formed after January 22. Gavron argues that Barak was a disaster as a politician and a strategist, and therefore good riddance.

Gavron’s argument builds on a particular interpretation of the failure of the peace process that puts most of the blame at Barak’s feet. Also, it’s not that Barak was a genius who always made the right decisions for Israel, but that compared to those who’ll be deciding on security matters, he thinks far more critically and will therefore be more open to alternate policies.

Gavron’s assertion hinges on the implication that Barak’s policies led to the Second Intifada, which in turn killed off the peace process because he chose to respond with brute force from the beginning. Yet the notion that Barak “decimated the Israeli peace camp” is ahistorical at best.

The flaws inherent in the Oslo process had already started the process of decline long before Barak. Settlement building continued apace under Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Benjamin Netanyahu before him. The shift from a collectivist ethos to consumerism and individualism that underlies Israelis’ lack of interest in the peace process was already evident by 1999.

By 1999, Palestinians themselves were wondering about the benefits and likely outcomes of the Oslo process. A March 1999 survey found that only 18.9% of Palestinians expected a Labor government would, if it won the May election, improve the Palestinian political condition; 49.8% expected things to remain the same, and 25.8% thought it would get worse.

I agree that Barak’s actions at Camp David were clumsy, but don’t see evidence they were nefarious. It’s not clear he was being deceitful in the way Gavron writes of his interview in September. By then Barak was more concerned with defending his actions, not proclaiming his true but previously hidden motives. Moreover, Barak’s decision to shift negotiations from Palestinians to Syrians and back indicates he wanted a deal with somebody, as opposed to trying to unmask every Arab actor around him.

And, of course, Barak really did make unprecedented offers, including on Jerusalem. He broke taboos that were strangling peace talks.

I also agree Barak was a terrible politician. He alienated every constituency he had, and his refusal to play nice with others—even to listen to them—caused considerable problems. And he made strategic errors: the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon is arguably one of them.

No one can claim Barak was a successful politician. But he was a constructive leader working to improve Israel’s security situation. Like Yitzhak Rabin, for Barak that could entail military or diplomatic tools. Given the results of the Likud primaries, whoever is brought into the ministerial security forum or Bibi’s inner cabinet will exert a less flexible line toward the West Bank, Hamas, Iran, and any number of other issues Israel will have to deal with.

Avigdor Lieberman, Eli Yishai, Danny Danon, Moshe Ya’alon, Silvan Shalom, Gideon Sa’ar, Naftali Bennett—or any of the other likely contenders after January 22 for top ministries—have, based on their historical record, either given short shrift to diplomatic as opposed to military initiatives, overshadowed their diplomacy with clumsy or ham-handed efforts, or undermined their foreign policy efforts with illiberal domestic policies.

Netanyahu is of the right-wing, but he’s not an extremist. He’s demonstrated time and again his ability to learn from past mistakes and to adapt to the structural constraints that surround him. He’s open to changing ideas and policies; the others are less so. Barak is a necessary lever in that process when it comes to Israel’s major security challenges. He can, for instance, be expected to adopt non-military ideas when they are viable—and then convince the prime minister of their validity by the weight of his arguments and credentials.

Take settlements as another example. Barak’s record here isn’t stellar—in April he helped authorize three illegal outposts. But more often than not he’s been a constraint on settlement activity. It’s more than we can expect from the new Likud MKs.

Gavron writes: “A successful soldier and a man of brilliant intellect, Barak proved singularly inept as a political leader.” I wasn’t promoting Barak’s political instincts. Once we separate that from his qualities as Defense Minister in a very right-wing coalition government, what he has to offer today becomes more obvious. Who does Gavron think will replace Barak?

Bibi: Keep Barak

In this piece for Open Zion, I argue that, not withstanding his announcement to retire, Ehud Barak is needed at the Defense Ministry as a necessary balance against other ministerial hawks. The full piece is below.

In a surprise move, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak has announced he’ll be leaving politics after the election on January 22. That doesn’t mean his political career is done: in an Israeli political constellation of large egos, Barak’s outshone all the others. Despite improved public opinion surveys for his Independence party after Operation Pillar of Cloud, though, it’s clear that the party won’t be a vehicle for a grand re-entrance. Labor won’t have him, after he cannibalized the party for personal gain. Likud doesn’t want him either: he’s a threat to prominent individuals’ own positions and to many he still represents the left and its delusions about peace. He has no viable political home.

But Israel, the Palestinians, and the rest of the world should hope that Barak somehow finds his way back to Defense, even if that means Benjamin Netanyahu, still likely to remain at the head of a coalition government, has to appoint him to the position. This would entail a fight: there are others in Likud who covet the position, particularly Moshe Ya’alon, and while Avigdor Lieberman says he’ll retain the Foreign Ministry, rumors persist that Netanyahu offered him his choice of ministries to run on a joint ticket with Likud; the second most powerful office in Israel has got to be a real temptation. The price of incurring those figures’ anger is worth it.

his isn’t because Barak’s a pacifist who will avoid war with Hamas or Iran, or because he has a grand plan for Israel that will bring peace to the region. It’s because he’ll be needed to balance out the hawkish, even reckless, preferences of Lieberman, Eli Yishai, and others.

In Haaretz’s account of decision-making behind Operation Pillar of Defense, Barak cautioned against widening the air war into a ground invasion while Lieberman pressed for one. Netanyahu was uncertain—he could have gone either way. It was Barak’s convincing explanation and insistence on the correctness of his analysis—backed by his real security credentials—that eventually swayed Netanyahu.

In the larger ministerial security forum, Yishai, Yuval Steinitz, and others also thought a ground invasion was a good idea. While Benny Begin and Dan Meridor opposed it, their influence is at an all-time low, and it’s not even clear they’ll be around come January 23. Without Ehud Barak to balance the unreconstructed hawks, Netanyahu is more likely to follow their advice.

Barak would have gone into Gaza with ground troops if he thought it was necessary, but he was well aware of the costs of doing so, and he was comfortable taking Israel’s gains and moving on. This is his modus operandi: during his own tenure as Prime Minister, he shifted easily and rapidly between pursuing talks with the Syrians and the Palestinians as he saw fit. At Camp David, he broke the sacredness of Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided and eternal capital. He doesn’t chase a military or diplomatic goal out of ideology, pride, revenge, or justice—he does it out of necessity.

Barak will do what he thinks is right for Israel. Of course, so will Lieberman and Yishai. But they have a hard time separating their perception of what’s right from what’s achievable and what is costly. Barak doesn’t. Israel could use that kind of clear thinking as the challenges of Hamas, the Palestinian bid at the U.N., Egypt, Syria, and Iran converge