Mr. Abbas Goes to Ankara

Fatah leader and President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas is in one of the toughest positions I’ve ever seen for a leader of a somewhat-recognized-but-not-really state. He’s physically hemmed in on all sides by Israel; his rival for control over Palestinian politics (Hamas) is growing stronger than him all the time; and he seems genuinely uncertain, or scared, about his options.

And yet with one visit to Turkey he made two moves that deserve not only commendation for their boldness, but also an immediate and positive response by Israel.

Israel has long demanded that Abbas separate himself from Hamas, in order to be recognized as a true moderate. During his visit to Turkey, Abbas did just that: he publicly disagreed with a very popular Hamas over the right of Israel to exist, which in turn underlines his support for two states.

And the location of the comments could not be more symbolic. Abbas took on his rival in the presence of the Turks, who have been growing closer to Hamas at the expense of ties with the PA, and who have been at fierce odds with Israel over its policies toward the Palestinians. It was a mild rebuke to Ankara at the same time.

The claim, then, that there is no Palestinian partner for peace is at best an incomplete one.

Unfortunately, in his characteristic way, Abbas undermined his own effort at the very same time. During the same visit that he chided Hamas, he also hinted—at a press conference with Turkish President Abdullah Gül—that if Israel continued with its settlement project, particularly in the explosive E1 area, he might go to the International Criminal Court.

On the one hand, you can understand Abbas’s frustration. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has continued expanding settlements throughout the West Bank and around East Jerusalem—a unilateral action if ever there was one. Yet after Abbas asked the United Nations General Assembly to recognize Palestine as a non-member state, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu accused Abbas of unilateral action and, flying into a rage, immediately began building more settlements.

At the UN, Abbas gave what can only be described as a vicious speech accusing Israel of every possible wrong and absolving Palestinians of their own responsibilities and agency. And one might argue that Abbas’s effort to form a unity government with Hamas is a sign of his secret tendencies toward extremism.

But on the other hand, one can see that Abbas has little choice but to take such a tough rhetorical stance. Israel has all but ignored him, preferring to lend credibility to Hamas and its violent ways instead of the PA’s diplomacy. And Israeli leaders themselves engage in harsh comments about and display a lack of sensitivity toward Palestinians. In a conflict increasingly incorporating collective memory, identity, and claims to victimhood, perhaps this is to be expected.

In the same hateful UN speech, Abbas explicitly recognized the 1967 Green Line as the border of the Palestinian state. Israel and Palestine can disagree over the exact route of the border, but that’s what negotiations are for. The focus on the Green Line is the very essence of the two state solution that Israel, including Netanyahu, has accepted.

And Abbas might contend that his calls for unity with Hamas are no different from the center-right Likud allying with far-right parties in an Israeli coalition. (I’m not convinced it’s the same, but the argument is there to be made.)

Abbas is trying, in his way. Given his circumstances, and despite his fumbling, this deserves Israel reciprocation, not condemnation. He’s clumsy, and he’s certainly made mistakes. But if leaders never negotiated with others who’d made blunders, we’d never get international agreements.

More Flawed than Normal?

The Israeli electoral and party systems have long been broken. Political parties were always breaking apart and merging—indeed, both Labor and Likud are themselves amalgamations of several factions, some of which have over time left the party and then returned to it. Up until the late 1990s it still functioned relatively well.

But this year’s election process seems more flawed than usual. Or maybe it’s because the process is more exposed than usual. Tzipi Livni, for instance, has been making political announcements on her Facebook page since she left Kadima. And there are a number of really good Israeli journalists tweeting from virtually every public meeting the parties have been holding.

First, the center/center-left is far more fragmented than ever before. It makes no electoral sense for there to be a Labor, a Tzipi Livni Party, a Yesh Atid, and a Kadima. It’s true that in the past there have been several parties clumped on a particular spot on the political spectrum. What’s different this time is that none of these parties show any sign of willingness to work closely with each other. Worse, they’ve all given indications that they’ll jump into a government with Bibi and Likud at the first opportunity.

Second, the sheer ego that’s been driving the electoral process is more staggering than normal. Individuals have been forming and leaving parties seemingly on a whim. Tzipi Livni didn’t want to play second fiddle to anybody else, so she formed a brand new party named after her. Yair Lapid didn’t want to be in second place either, so he, too, formed his own party.

Ehud Barak abandoned the party he specifically formed to enter government because he couldn’t handle the embarrassment of staying with it to the bitter end. Amir Peretz sulked because he was at number three in Labor and couldn’t get Shelly Yachimovich to give in to his demands, so he left the party he had once led and went to Livni.

Haim Amsalem was kicked out of Shas for dissenting from the party’s rabbinical line, and formed Am Shalem. Michael Ben Ari and Aryeh Eldad didn’t like the new leadership in National Union, so they left to form Strong Israel.

If the stakes for Israelis and Palestinians weren’t so high, this would make for a good drama—or comedy. (Michael Koplow appropriately compared Israeli politics to an HBO series.)

But weighty issues remain to be adequately dealt with. Hamas and Hezbollah are clearly much stronger than ever before; relations with Turkey and Egypt are persistently stagnant, with no sign of potential improvement any time soon; the Iranian nuclear question is coming to a head within the next six to 12 months; the Syrian endgame looks to be here; and the recognition of Palestine as a non-member state at the UN is raising new questions about political and legal maneuvers and putting renewed emphasis on Israeli policies toward the West Bank.

Israel is distracted from dealing with these issues because parties and politicians are busy fighting for what they see as their rightful share of the political pie. The saddest part of it all is that the outcome of the elections is unlikely to change things all that much. The right is likely to still get between 65 and 68 seats, or more (the most recent poll gives it 73 Knesset seats—though I should repeat that I’m not convinced “left” and “right” are necessarily helpful categories). Bibi will probably still be prime minister. And, as I said, most parties would join Bibi’s coalition if they could—except the Arab parties (which won’t be asked) and Meretz (which seems most likely to stand more on principle than any other party).

The silver lining is that the electoral lists are now set, by law. We’ll see less overt and public plotting and scheming…at least until January 23.

Why I Support the Palestinian Request at the UN

When Mahmoud Abbas said last year he was going to ask the Security Council for recognition, I was at first opposed to the idea, thinking the price would be too high. I changed my mind, believing it might help light a fire under Israel. That didn’t happen, mostly because the bid itself failed.

And so I still support the Palestinian request for non-member state status. Mostly it’s because the Palestinian Authority under Fatah and Abbas is never going to get a shot at genuine negotiations so long as domestic conditions in Israel don’t change.

That’s not to say, of course, that only Israel is responsible for past failures and potential future progress. Nor do I think Israel should unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank.

But looking at Israel specifically, all I see are obstacles. The Israeli public is less interested in the Palestinians than it’s ever been. The electoral list that emerged from Likud’s primaries this week is composed of members who take a hard line on negotiations over land, settlements, and a Palestinian state. Given that the party is most likely to still be the core of a new coalition government, I’d guess we can expect even less government interest than there is now.

Israel, of course, argues that it’s always ready for negotiations. Yet the hard truth is that it’s not. It’s insistence that the PA recognize Israel as a Jewish state first is a red herring; worse, it’s an excuse to avoid talks. As has been argued by many countless times before, there is no necessary or good reason for the Palestinians to do this, and every reason not to. And it’s a precondition that Israel insists on even as it calls for Abbas to sit down without preconditions.

Israel’s insistence that settlements are not an obstacle to negotiations is also misleading. The reality is that, as facts on the ground, they shrink the potential land area open to negotiations. The Israeli government insists that any final agreement accounts for settlements blocs as part of Israel.  Yet the manner by which “neighborhoods” are spun off from existing settlements and then included as part of the settlement’s territory, plus the physical, legal, and security infrastructure that is built up around them, absorbs more and more land considered off-limits.

Progress on peace talks is essential for Israel’s well-being, too. World trends are moving against the occupation and the settlements. Hamas is growing stronger all the time. If it doesn’t get ahead of the curve, Israel’s ability to contribute to management of the conflict and shaping of outcomes will diminish.

There’s just no evidence that a successful Palestinian bid will change things for Israel for the worse. Rather, all the evidence points to the conclusion that not changing the status quo is the most dangerous for Israel.

Winners and Losers

My first reaction of who comes out stronger and who comes out weaker from the Gaza conflict was posted at Open Zion. It is reprinted in full below.

A ceasefire was announced between Israel and Hamas and came into force an hour ago. It’s early yet, but an initial glance at potential winners and losers gives some insight into how the ceasefire came about, and how it might play out in the region—if it holds.

Some short-term losers: Turkey and Egypt, both of whom claimed to be staunch supporters of Hamas but failed to press for anything that might resemble a Hamas victory. Turkey was at first extraordinarily quiet, pretty much abdicating any responsibility for Hamas and Gaza after spending a few years damaging relations with Israel for their sake and thus undermining its effort to enhance its appeal to the Arab world. Then, once he got going, Prime Minister Erdoğan ruined any chance in the near future for a reconciliation with Israel by calling it a “terrorist state” and condemning the US for supporting it. (See Michael Koplow’s excellent discussion of this.)

For its part, Egypt, despite President Morsi’s declarations, didn’t do anything that hadn’t been done under the Mubarak regime. It’s true that Morsi’s rhetoric was far more supportive of Hamas, and reports are that his ideas for a ceasefire annoyed the Israelis because it so overtly favored Hamas. But the outcome was the same as under Mubarak: the status quo ante, with Hamas getting no promises from Israel to lift the blockade (though Israel seems to have said it would ease up on attacks on Hamas).

Long term losers: Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah. Jonathan Schanzer asked whether Hamas was upstaging the PLO. Abbas displayed total impotence during the conflict; more, he was pushed completely to the side. Hamas’s strategy of sticking to its “resistance” guns and gathering increasing legitimacy and recognition from others makes Abbas/Fatah/the PLO/the PA less and less relevant in Palestinian politics. As far as I can see, the only things that can save them are a successful bid at the U.N., or tangible progress in negotiations with Israel.

The other long-term loser is Israel. As I’ve argued before, Israel has no long term strategy regarding Gaza. Its victory in a limited military campaign will only strengthen the perception that its tactical-military emphasis works and doesn’t need to be changed. This means it’ll be harder for Israel to accept a new formula for maintaining security and achieving peace. It also means we’re likely to see a repeat of November’s events again.

Winners: The obvious one is Netanyahu, for pulling off a clear military victory and moving past his blunder in the Western Wall Tunnel riots of 1996, and for now having a clear foreign policy victory to point to during the campaign; Ehud Barak for showing he still matters (first polls give his Independence the greatest numbers of seats since the campaign began, though I’m not sure it will last to January); Qatar for inserting itself into this arena; and missile/rocket defense systems.

Steven Cook argues the U.S. was in a very difficult position during the conflict, but I think President Obama also comes out a winner. I’d argue he handled the crisis extremely well, by hanging back and letting local actors—especially Egypt—take the lead, thus giving them a stake in the post-war system. He also provided continual encouragement and prodding, through phone calls to Morsi and Netanyahu and with Secretary of State Clinton assuring Netanyahu in person that this was a good idea and the US supported Israel’s right to self-defense.

On second thought, we might consider putting Egypt in this category instead. It navigated very well the shoals of public opinion, Muslim Brotherhood pressure, Hamas’s demands, its own strategic interests, and Israel’s actions. That Morsi was able to pull off a Mubarak-style outcome, even under changed conditions, suggests Egypt remains a regional player, and the outside player when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The more things change…

Why Israel (Probably) Won’t Invade Gaza

At this point it looks increasingly unlikely there will be an Israeli invasion of Gaza. It’s still possible—and a complete breakdown of ceasefire efforts or a major development in the fighting (such as the killing of large numbers of Israeli civilians, or resumption of suicide attacks) would all but ensure one. Possible, but unlikely.

I’d been skeptical from the beginning that Israel was working toward a ground invasion of Gaza, though as events unfolded (Hamas rockets fired toward Tel Aviv then the Jerusalem area, Israel’s call-up of tens of thousands of reservists) I did think chances for one were increasing, even while it seemed Israel might be looking for a way to wind things down.

Israel was coming off of two campaigns (Gaza 2008-2009 and Lebanon 2006) that, while they may have been ostensible victories, entailed several deeper costs to Israel in financial terms, international goodwill and legitimacy, domestic politics, lives lost, public discontent, and military reputation—all primarily due to the ground invasion, and all of which was known to the current prime minister who was already risk-averse. I thought that under these conditions, Israel’s interest in a ground invasion was far less than assumed.

In addition, if it remains on the trajectory it’s currently on, Israel will have had no choice but to invade Gaza. Such a small country cannot afford, politically or economically, to maintain tens of thousands of citizens in military waiting-mode. It’ll either have to use the troops it called up (i.e., an invasion), or send them back home. But if Israel does the latter, it will signal to Hamas that it had all been a pretense. Poker in Middle Eastern politics doesn’t leave room for all that many bluffs. Using ground troops would, unfortunately, be the only way out.

I believe the government is aware that the costs of a ground invasion outweigh the benefits it’s reaping from the air war than. I imagine an incomplete version of the balance sheet looks something like this:

Benefits of air war 

• Degrade Hamas’s capabilities by killing more of its operatives and rockets

• Smash Hamas infrastructure with less risk

• Enforce extended period of “quiet”

• Restore deterrence

• Control the violence without having to destroy large swaths of Gaza to clear the way for ground troops

• Make Hamas seem impotent

A ground invasion (even combined with the ongoing air war) would have the same benefits. Yet short of the overthrow of Hamas and re-occupation of Gaza, there isn’t much more to be accomplished with ground troops. But a number of costs that didn’t exist with the air campaign would appear on the ledger.

(Extra) Costs of ground invasion

• Endanger Israeli soldiers’ lives, or risk them being captured

• Put soldiers in the position of treating Gazan civilians harshly, even immorally, raising the possibility of legal prosecution at home or threat of it abroad

• Earn opprobrium of international community for treatment of civilians and causing widespread damage and casualties

• Give Hamas the opportunity to demonstrate more of its military capabilities

Remember, too, that Benjamin Netanyahu is at the helm, and running for re-election. Until the campaign, public opinion surveys gave Likud Beiteinu less seats than it currently holds in the Knesset. First polls out give the ticket a slight boost, though not back up to its 42 mandates. More importantly, they also give Ehud Barak’s Independence the best results since the election was called. If Bibi wants to retain Barak as Defense Minister, this will certainly help.

Supporting this calculation is also the fact that right now, according to a Haaretz poll, over 80% of the public supports Pillar of Defense. But a significant minority (30%) opposes a ground war. That first number will drop, and the second one will rise, pretty quickly with a ground operation and all its costs.

Israel is also running out of military targets “easily” struck by air. Finally, growing international attention—including heavy pressure from US President Obama—can provide the necessary cover for Israel to claim it achieved its objectives (though they have been only vaguely defined).

Given all, we shouldn’t be surprised if Bibi decides against putting boots on the ground.

Barak: Hamas Broke the Rules

This article by Aluf Benn struck me as containing important comments by Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak:

Speaking at the annual memorial for Moshe Dayan at Tel Aviv University, and in private conversations reported by my colleague Yossi Verter, Barak presented as the casus for the current belli the fact that Hamas “broke the rules” by firing an antitank missile at a military jeep on the Israeli side of the border last weekend, and blowing up a “tunnel with half a ton of antitank explosives that was partly in our territory.”

He implied that Israel could not agree to the new game rules, which in effect created a Palestinian security zone on the Israeli side of the fence that could mean death for anyone entering it. That is what the IDF did on the Palestinian side of the fence, enforcing a “special security zone” there. But what’s good for the goose is prohibited to the gander.

This kind of information helps answer the question of “why now?” (Neither example is about missiles, by the way.)

Do Targeted Killings “Work”?

As we consider the course of the Israel-Hamas conflict, I asked whether targeted killings–which is how Israel began its military action–really work in stopping rocket fire. My answer was first posted at Open Zion, but it’s reprinted here in full:

Israel began its current attack on Hamas with a tactical surprise, by killing Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari on November 14. The previous day, Israeli leaders were already publicly musing about a return to this policy of “targeted killings” as a relatively cost-free way of responding to Hamas’s barrage of rockets.

But does the policy actually work in stopping Hamas from continued rocket attacks? Yes—but only in the short term, and only because today Hamas also has an interest in avoiding a battle to the death.

Israel has a long history of assassinating (or, in the more sanitized analytical term, “decapitating”) leaders of militant and terrorist groups. As a policy, it began in earnest in the 1970s, as Israel both killed off individuals in the PLO and tracked down the murderers of the Munich Olympics athletes.

In 1988, top PLO official Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was assassinated. Throughout the 1990s, Israel targeted other groups, killing Hezbollah leader Abbas Musawi in 1992, Islamic Jihad chief Fathi Shikaki in 1995, and then focusing mostly on Hamas and, as the Second Intifada raged, Fatah and Fatah offshoots. The later 2000s saw more assassinations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders, culminating in March-April 2004 with the deaths of Hamas leaders Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi.

The scholarly literature is divided on whether assassinations of leaders of terrorist/militant groups work or not. Bruce Hoffman argues that the policy only incites groups to work harder to kill, while Bryan Price contends that in the long-term, decapitation leads to instability in and then collapse of the organization. For his part, Dan Byman suggests the overall balance sheet is just very difficult to assess.

In Israel’s case, killing off leaders and operatives of Hamas has a mixed record. The assassination of Yehiya Ayyash in 1996 led to an unprecedented campaign of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. On the other hand, the spate of assassinations during the Second Intifada put Hamas on the defensive and undermined its capacity and will to operate as aggressively.

We don’t have enough evidence to know if this would also be the case for rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel has successfully used other means to stop rocket fire. It launched a major air and ground assault on Hamas in 2008-2009 to stop heavy rocket fire, and that certainly convinced Hamas to contain the violence coming out of Gaza.

But we can extrapolate from previous experience that decapitation does incentivize Hamas to ease up on its attacks. What makes it harder to gauge the utility of the policy is that Hamas’s raison d’être is no longer the destruction of Israel (or at least that’s not its only position). As a major player in the Palestinian Authority from 2006 until its violent takeover of Gaza in 2007, and as the governing power in the Strip since then, Hamas has a stake in staying alive and relevant. It’s increasingly recognized by other states as legitimate, giving it the chance of becoming more powerful in Palestinian politics.

Its own internal politics suggest it’s struggling to reorganize in the wake of the Syrian civil war and efforts by Fatah to take the initiative at the UN. To fend off its rivals, Hamas can’t be more open to negotiation than Fatah, but it can’t be less committed to “resistance” than the smaller Gazan groups.

Hamas isn’t looking to go out in a blaze of glory anymore, if it ever was. It wants to carefully balance out its actions.

What this suggests is that targeted killings degrade Hamas’s capabilities in the short term, forcing its officials underground, making it harder to exert leadership over the group, and promoting greater caution about antagonizing Israel. But Hamas’s goal to remain relevant makes it rely on rockets as well as other means, and sometimes its need will be greater—prompting heavier rocket fire—while at other times it will be lesser—leading to restraint on its part.

Assassinations, then, are likely to work in the short term, but can only work long-term in conjunction with other carrots and sticks. Israel, then, should first determine what its strategic and tactical, and political and military, objectives are, before using them as a policy tool.

Israel-Hamas Implications Thus Far

What if the Israel-Hamas clash stops today or tomorrow? (I know, a big assumption; things could certainly be more drawn out or escalate) Where would that leave things? Some speculation:

Israel will probably have reduced weapons stores of Hamas and other Palestinian groups. Perhaps Israel will have especially reduced the longer-range rockets. Perhaps Israel will have taken out missiles that came from Libya to Gaza.

Iron Dome appears to have proven its effectiveness. (which, as a side note, leads me to believe Hamas and others will think about how to innovate to circumvent the limits imposed by Iron Dome. Look for different means, different technology etc Just like missiles are more appealing when Israeli walls closed off other tactical options.)

Hamas and others have demonstrated they can aim for Tel Aviv and, possibly, Jerusalem or its environs. (I am less *certain* than @mkoplow that central Jerusalem was the target. But maybe I was not paying attention) [I don’t claim to know which of various factions are firing the missiles. For more on factions in Gaza, see this Crisis Group report, Radical Islam in Gaza]

I don’t know whether for one or both sides this was a dress run for a confrontation connected to an Israeli military attack on Iran. (Amir Oren wonders regarding the Israeli side).

Neither side articulated or demonstrated a new strategy. This is Groundhog Day. Various levels of escalations this year in March (here, here) and June (here, here). Now November. The 2008-09 battle was only four years ago.

Both Hamas and the Government of Israel will claim victory and say they stood strong in the face of danger. That would likely help Netanyahu and Likud at the polls next year.

I don’t see how this changes perceptions much – Israelis and Palestinians about the other or Arab states, the US, and the international community about Israelis and Palestinians. Despite the much-talked about battle of social media, does much actually shift? Are lower casualty numbers meaningful?

My wildcard: what does this mean for Egypt?

I have written this with a lot of uncertainty, even about some things that have been reported on (like Iron Dome numbers). Moreover, how a cease-fire or de-escalation takes place might be meaningful but that has not happened yet. More to come….

 

 

 

 

 

 

Israel in Gaza: Politics or Bad Decision-Making?

My first organized thoughts on the Israel-Hamas conflict was were posted at Open Zion yesterday. Here’s the main conclusion:

It’s hard to argue politics wasn’t somewhere in the back of the minds of the elected leaders when they decided to go ahead with the military campaign. But such an assault is a very risky move: while so far, the Israel Defense Forces has successfully minimized civilian casualties, there was no guarantee this would or will be the case. There is even less guarantee that Israel will be able to avoid a ground invasion in response to whatever Hamas does—which would in turn raise real questions about the ultimate military objective and exit strategy, and the associated costs of not having these.

Click here to read the full post.

Will a major Israeli attack on Gaza improve Israel’s security situation?

Will a major Israeli attack on Gaza improve Israel’s security situation? I think the answer depends on what one thinks is possible between Israelis and Palestinians.

If, to take the view of many in the current government of Israel, the Palestinians and especially Hamas are not interested in a political resolution, then one develops a policy of containing the problem. That means using military means to control, weaken, and degrade Palestinian militants, e.g. in Gaza. Kill Hamas or other leaders, destroy weapons caches. In other words, the Israeli-Palestinian relationship is destined to be a series of skirmishes, attacks, wars, and the like. That is all that is possible (add “in this generation” if you like). Call it military conflict management.

If, however, there is a political pathway toward better relations, the frequent resort to military force itself becomes a central impediment to a political resolution. Maybe Israel should engage with Hamas and negotiate. Or maybe Israel and the Palestinian Authority should sit down and negotiate a two-state solution. In short, the refusal to seriously test a diplomatic solution undermines the claim that only force works and there is no diplomatic resolution. You cannot keep complaining about X (e.g. rocket fire) if your own policy locks in X.

In the first view, the fact that Israel just – in 2008-09 – fought a war against Gaza is a sad but true reflection of reality. Such wars are necessary to contain the problem. But in the second view, the fact that Israel may be launching a major military operation just four years after the last one in Gaza is a sign of the bankruptcy of the “Operation Fill-in-the-Blank” approach to Israeli-Palestinian relations. The need to launch the operation is proof that this pathway is not leading to greater Israeli security.