The Resurgence of American Diplomacy in the Middle East

When President Barack Obama announced his trip to Israel, there was widespread speculation for the motivations. I thought it was a grab-bag of reasons, including for domestic political purposes, to connect (finally) with the Jewish-Israeli public, to improve personal relations with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and to talk about Iran and Syria.

On these grounds the visit has already been a success. But it seems the trip was about American regional diplomacy at least as much as it was about the American-Israeli relationship. This makes sense: In his second term Obama is looking to shape his legacy, and can now be more proactive—as opposed to reactive, as he was at the onset of the Arab Awakening—in foreign affairs without having to worry about re-election. It’s clear now that the point of the visit was to set the conditions for an improvement in the U.S. position in the region.

For some time analysts have been convinced that the U.S. is on its way out of the Middle East, retreating or simply impotent in the wake of the Arab Awakening. But this argument rests on a consideration of American hard power only, reads Obama’s hesitation in his first term into his second, and ignores Obama’s own modus operandi.

To understand Obama’s foreign policy we need to look at the preference he’s had for engaging with Republicans on domestic policy. Here he’s adopted a patient, low-key role. His habit has been to let other prominent individuals or groups engage in public battles over a given issue, and at some moment near the end move quietly in to offer suggestions—not orders or demands—to both sides of a dispute. In this way, he persuades them that butting heads has not worked, but that compromise will.

Obama’s trip to Israel was an exercise in in this type of American soft power. First, during his time in Israel, he charmed Netanyahu, a man with whom he previously had very tense personal relations. Having created space with its leaders, Obama then gave a stirring speech to Israeli students at the Jerusalem Convention Center. He highlighted the Jewish connection to the area, bore witness to the Jewish/Zionist struggles over time (including their contemporary security concerns), and called on them to act now in the name of Israeli Jewishness and democracy, and justice for Palestinians. These themes were echoed in a shorter speech at Yad Vashem. His visit to sites of memory and identity in Israel also validated Jewish-Israelis’ Zionism.

While critics argue that this is pandering or represent the usual ignoring of Palestinians, connecting with Israeli public opinion is important. No final agreement will be ratified in Israel unless politicians know enough Israelis (particularly Jewish Israelis) are on board with it. Given the skepticism of the Palestinians and the peace process more generally among that cohort, laying the groundwork isn’t just good politics, it’s essential.

Second, at the very end of his trip, Obama brought together Netanyahu and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan through a phone call that, for all intents and purposes, settled the most outstanding of their immediate disagreements (an Israeli apology for and compensation over the deaths of Turkish citizens killed during the attack on the Mavi Marmara in 2010).

It’s not clear that Obama promised either of the two anything specific, but what he did do was remind Netanyahu and Erdoğan that the region is at a critical moment, and that the two countries have common interests that trump these kinds of disputes. Like a mediator, he made sure that they knew all of their interests—including that of the United States—required coordination, even if it didn’t include full agreement on all issues.

Third, Obama appears to have convinced the Israelis that the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority in the West Bank really is their only partner for peace, particularly as Hamas’s regional stature continues to rise. To this end, the Administration has managed to unblock $500 million in aid to the PA, which Congress had previously frozen, at the same time that Jerusalem has decided to resume transfer of tax revenues to the PA, also frozen after Mahmoud Abbas asked the United Nations General Assembly to grant the Palestinians non-observer member state status.

Finally, Obama has publicly discussed bringing the Arab states more directly into the peace process. This will provide political cover for the PA to make unpopular decisions about concessions during talks. But tying the Arab states to the negotiations further isolates Iran, and also gives them a stake in the outcome.

The conventional wisdom is that the Israelis and Palestinians aren’t interested at this point in resolving their conflict, and that the Arab Awakening, Syria, and Iran are forcing the White House to wait on events more than seek to manage them. But Obama’s trip to the region has demonstrated that this isn’t true.

Certainly there is a long way to go before Israelis and Palestinians make peace, before Saudis and Israelis overcome decades of hostility, or even before Israelis and Turks return to full normalized relations. But even still, it’s clear that Obama is preparing a network to support Washington’s leadership vis-à-vis Iran and Syria, and to better respond to the Arab Awakening.

He’s done all this quietly, by lowering expectations beforehand, and by convincing Israelis, Palestinians, Turks, and Arabs that they share common goals. This is the essence of persuasion. Obama’s ability to project American hard power in the region might be fading, but that’s not the case with American soft power.

Bibi’s apology to Turkey

Barack Obama really is a magician. Just as he was about to leave Israel, he announced that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had spoken by telephone. Even more, Bibi apologized to Erdoğan for the deaths of Turkish citizens during the Mavi Marmara affair.

I did not see this coming, and I’d be surprised if anyone else did, either. The trip that everybody (including me) thought was about domestic American politics, Iran, resetting the relationship with Bibi, giving comfort to Israelis, and demonstrating support for the Palestinian Authority government in the West Bank was also, it turns out, about Obama’s broader regional diplomacy.

Here are my initial thoughts about the phone call and its aftermath:

1. Turkey gained much without compromising anything. Erdoğan got the biggest thing he had been demanding since the attacks, which was an Israeli apology. His other demands—compensation and an end to the siege of Gaza—are either easily met (compensation) or non-starters (ending the siege), so this was the most important. Starting to repair relations with Israel also removes major irritants that affected Turkey’s relations with the United States, some European countries, and NATO, disrupting processes and regional security plans. Turkey easily came out on top here.

In return, Erdoğan said Ankara would drop charges against Israeli military for their role in the killings. But this was a very minor concession: it would never have resulted in actual prosecution or sentencing. If Turkey had pursued it, it might have constrained the ability of some officers to travel around the world, but even then it would be more irksome than anything else.

2. It’s hard to avoid noticing that the apology was only realized with Avigdor Lieberman gone from the Foreign Ministry. Blustering and belligerent, Lieberman was never the right choice for the position. If Bibi’s apology can warm his relationship with Obama, reset the relationship with Turkey, and lead to the inclusion rather than exclusion of Israel in global and regional forums, conferences, and exercises, then it’s hard to argue bringing Lieberman back is a good thing. In fact, the obvious conclusion is the opposite one: Israel can accomplish much with Foreign Minister who’s pragmatic and has a broader sense of Israel’s position in the world.

3. I’d like to know how Obama persuaded Bibi to call. Did Obama promise extra aid to Israel? Was this a quid pro quo, and if so, for what?

4. It remains to be seen what happens next between Israel and Turkey, of course. I don’t think we’ll see a return to the mid-1990s levels of cooperation and warmth. But this is a good start as both countries seek to find their place in a changing Middle East.

Changing the operative principle of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations?

I agree with Shai Feldman that if Israeli-Palestinian negotiations start up under President Obama, the way in which talks are conducted needs to change:

Requirement 5: Change the operative principle of negotiations. The principle upon which Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from Camp David to Taba were based—nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon—should be dropped. It had a toxic effect because it meant that any progress achieved was held hostage to the most difficult issues. Instead, the opposite principle should be adopted: whatever is agreed upon should be implemented. This will allow Israelis and Palestinians to see progress on the ground. And however small that progress might be, it will be very significant given the present pessimism among Palestinians and Israelis alike.

But I think it is also important to note that his new principle creates a new problem. Negotiating parties may want to see the whole picture before they make fundamental concessions. That is, before Israel concedes Palestinian sovereignty in many parts of East Jerusalem or before the PA accepts the right of return in theory but not (really) in implementation, they may want to see the big picture and make sure they get reciprocal concessions of equal value.

In other words, Feldman assumes the issues can be disentangled and that may be true to an extent with initial measures and minor issues. But I wonder especially if on the core issues that will be hard to do. Both sides may need to construct hypothetical scenarios of mutual concessions before they commit. Since you cannot always negotiate about parallel issues at exactly the same time or pace, you may end up with breakthroughs at different times, in which case you may have to wait for other issue baskets to ‘catch up.’

We may really need both principles with clearly demarcated areas in which they apply.

Mr. Abbas Goes to Ankara

Fatah leader and President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas is in one of the toughest positions I’ve ever seen for a leader of a somewhat-recognized-but-not-really state. He’s physically hemmed in on all sides by Israel; his rival for control over Palestinian politics (Hamas) is growing stronger than him all the time; and he seems genuinely uncertain, or scared, about his options.

And yet with one visit to Turkey he made two moves that deserve not only commendation for their boldness, but also an immediate and positive response by Israel.

Israel has long demanded that Abbas separate himself from Hamas, in order to be recognized as a true moderate. During his visit to Turkey, Abbas did just that: he publicly disagreed with a very popular Hamas over the right of Israel to exist, which in turn underlines his support for two states.

And the location of the comments could not be more symbolic. Abbas took on his rival in the presence of the Turks, who have been growing closer to Hamas at the expense of ties with the PA, and who have been at fierce odds with Israel over its policies toward the Palestinians. It was a mild rebuke to Ankara at the same time.

The claim, then, that there is no Palestinian partner for peace is at best an incomplete one.

Unfortunately, in his characteristic way, Abbas undermined his own effort at the very same time. During the same visit that he chided Hamas, he also hinted—at a press conference with Turkish President Abdullah Gül—that if Israel continued with its settlement project, particularly in the explosive E1 area, he might go to the International Criminal Court.

On the one hand, you can understand Abbas’s frustration. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has continued expanding settlements throughout the West Bank and around East Jerusalem—a unilateral action if ever there was one. Yet after Abbas asked the United Nations General Assembly to recognize Palestine as a non-member state, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu accused Abbas of unilateral action and, flying into a rage, immediately began building more settlements.

At the UN, Abbas gave what can only be described as a vicious speech accusing Israel of every possible wrong and absolving Palestinians of their own responsibilities and agency. And one might argue that Abbas’s effort to form a unity government with Hamas is a sign of his secret tendencies toward extremism.

But on the other hand, one can see that Abbas has little choice but to take such a tough rhetorical stance. Israel has all but ignored him, preferring to lend credibility to Hamas and its violent ways instead of the PA’s diplomacy. And Israeli leaders themselves engage in harsh comments about and display a lack of sensitivity toward Palestinians. In a conflict increasingly incorporating collective memory, identity, and claims to victimhood, perhaps this is to be expected.

In the same hateful UN speech, Abbas explicitly recognized the 1967 Green Line as the border of the Palestinian state. Israel and Palestine can disagree over the exact route of the border, but that’s what negotiations are for. The focus on the Green Line is the very essence of the two state solution that Israel, including Netanyahu, has accepted.

And Abbas might contend that his calls for unity with Hamas are no different from the center-right Likud allying with far-right parties in an Israeli coalition. (I’m not convinced it’s the same, but the argument is there to be made.)

Abbas is trying, in his way. Given his circumstances, and despite his fumbling, this deserves Israel reciprocation, not condemnation. He’s clumsy, and he’s certainly made mistakes. But if leaders never negotiated with others who’d made blunders, we’d never get international agreements.

Why I Support the Palestinian Request at the UN

When Mahmoud Abbas said last year he was going to ask the Security Council for recognition, I was at first opposed to the idea, thinking the price would be too high. I changed my mind, believing it might help light a fire under Israel. That didn’t happen, mostly because the bid itself failed.

And so I still support the Palestinian request for non-member state status. Mostly it’s because the Palestinian Authority under Fatah and Abbas is never going to get a shot at genuine negotiations so long as domestic conditions in Israel don’t change.

That’s not to say, of course, that only Israel is responsible for past failures and potential future progress. Nor do I think Israel should unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank.

But looking at Israel specifically, all I see are obstacles. The Israeli public is less interested in the Palestinians than it’s ever been. The electoral list that emerged from Likud’s primaries this week is composed of members who take a hard line on negotiations over land, settlements, and a Palestinian state. Given that the party is most likely to still be the core of a new coalition government, I’d guess we can expect even less government interest than there is now.

Israel, of course, argues that it’s always ready for negotiations. Yet the hard truth is that it’s not. It’s insistence that the PA recognize Israel as a Jewish state first is a red herring; worse, it’s an excuse to avoid talks. As has been argued by many countless times before, there is no necessary or good reason for the Palestinians to do this, and every reason not to. And it’s a precondition that Israel insists on even as it calls for Abbas to sit down without preconditions.

Israel’s insistence that settlements are not an obstacle to negotiations is also misleading. The reality is that, as facts on the ground, they shrink the potential land area open to negotiations. The Israeli government insists that any final agreement accounts for settlements blocs as part of Israel.  Yet the manner by which “neighborhoods” are spun off from existing settlements and then included as part of the settlement’s territory, plus the physical, legal, and security infrastructure that is built up around them, absorbs more and more land considered off-limits.

Progress on peace talks is essential for Israel’s well-being, too. World trends are moving against the occupation and the settlements. Hamas is growing stronger all the time. If it doesn’t get ahead of the curve, Israel’s ability to contribute to management of the conflict and shaping of outcomes will diminish.

There’s just no evidence that a successful Palestinian bid will change things for Israel for the worse. Rather, all the evidence points to the conclusion that not changing the status quo is the most dangerous for Israel.

Winners and Losers

My first reaction of who comes out stronger and who comes out weaker from the Gaza conflict was posted at Open Zion. It is reprinted in full below.

A ceasefire was announced between Israel and Hamas and came into force an hour ago. It’s early yet, but an initial glance at potential winners and losers gives some insight into how the ceasefire came about, and how it might play out in the region—if it holds.

Some short-term losers: Turkey and Egypt, both of whom claimed to be staunch supporters of Hamas but failed to press for anything that might resemble a Hamas victory. Turkey was at first extraordinarily quiet, pretty much abdicating any responsibility for Hamas and Gaza after spending a few years damaging relations with Israel for their sake and thus undermining its effort to enhance its appeal to the Arab world. Then, once he got going, Prime Minister Erdoğan ruined any chance in the near future for a reconciliation with Israel by calling it a “terrorist state” and condemning the US for supporting it. (See Michael Koplow’s excellent discussion of this.)

For its part, Egypt, despite President Morsi’s declarations, didn’t do anything that hadn’t been done under the Mubarak regime. It’s true that Morsi’s rhetoric was far more supportive of Hamas, and reports are that his ideas for a ceasefire annoyed the Israelis because it so overtly favored Hamas. But the outcome was the same as under Mubarak: the status quo ante, with Hamas getting no promises from Israel to lift the blockade (though Israel seems to have said it would ease up on attacks on Hamas).

Long term losers: Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah. Jonathan Schanzer asked whether Hamas was upstaging the PLO. Abbas displayed total impotence during the conflict; more, he was pushed completely to the side. Hamas’s strategy of sticking to its “resistance” guns and gathering increasing legitimacy and recognition from others makes Abbas/Fatah/the PLO/the PA less and less relevant in Palestinian politics. As far as I can see, the only things that can save them are a successful bid at the U.N., or tangible progress in negotiations with Israel.

The other long-term loser is Israel. As I’ve argued before, Israel has no long term strategy regarding Gaza. Its victory in a limited military campaign will only strengthen the perception that its tactical-military emphasis works and doesn’t need to be changed. This means it’ll be harder for Israel to accept a new formula for maintaining security and achieving peace. It also means we’re likely to see a repeat of November’s events again.

Winners: The obvious one is Netanyahu, for pulling off a clear military victory and moving past his blunder in the Western Wall Tunnel riots of 1996, and for now having a clear foreign policy victory to point to during the campaign; Ehud Barak for showing he still matters (first polls give his Independence the greatest numbers of seats since the campaign began, though I’m not sure it will last to January); Qatar for inserting itself into this arena; and missile/rocket defense systems.

Steven Cook argues the U.S. was in a very difficult position during the conflict, but I think President Obama also comes out a winner. I’d argue he handled the crisis extremely well, by hanging back and letting local actors—especially Egypt—take the lead, thus giving them a stake in the post-war system. He also provided continual encouragement and prodding, through phone calls to Morsi and Netanyahu and with Secretary of State Clinton assuring Netanyahu in person that this was a good idea and the US supported Israel’s right to self-defense.

On second thought, we might consider putting Egypt in this category instead. It navigated very well the shoals of public opinion, Muslim Brotherhood pressure, Hamas’s demands, its own strategic interests, and Israel’s actions. That Morsi was able to pull off a Mubarak-style outcome, even under changed conditions, suggests Egypt remains a regional player, and the outside player when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The more things change…

Does Israel have political options? Yes.

The concept that Israel has no choice but to use military force or go to war has a long history in Israeli strategic and popular thinking. Again today, one hears Israel has no other option but to attack Hamas and Gaza. I beg to differ. Here are two options:

1. Given a cease-fire and de-escalation from the last few days, Hamas and Israel could talk about a long-term truce. At this point, I’ll quote @doranimated from a twitter change today: “You totally misread Hamas, IMHO. There’s no deal to be had.” But why not test the waters and see if some of the leadership of Hamas would like to move away from violent resistance, as has often been claimed? (see here too for Brent’s take) The status quo is unstable (both on the Israeli-Palestinian and regional front), deadly, and insecure. Millions of civilians are suffering. So start small and build toward a longer cease-fire; if it fails, Israel and Hamas are just back to the same confrontation and major flareups every few months. Hamas clearly does not need a long-term cease-fire to be in a position to do Israel harm.

Egypt would likely welcome an effort to mediate a more substantial Israeli-Hamas relationship. Any betterment of the situation in Gaza would take pressure off the Egyptian government. It would reduce the centrality of deciding how open to keep Rafah. It might help address the chaos, smuggling, and insecurity in Sinai. It would be an opportunity to demonstrate to the United States that Egyptian-US ties (and aid!) are worth protecting.

2. OK, fine, you think that the Hamas-Israel route is bankrupt? Israel could take a political process with President Mahmoud Abbas seriously. Build up political relations with the West Bank, take Fayyadism* seriously – not just economically but also politically – and get back to high-level negotiations. By moving toward a two-state solution with Abbas, Israel could try to marginalize Hamas; this is not a new idea. Arab states, like Egypt or Qatar, that saw a real two-state solution developing might even lean on Hamas to jump on the bandwagon.

To pursue this second alternative, Israel has to do a few things. It needs to jettison the “no partner” talk. In 2000-01 (Camp David/Taba) and again in 2008 (Annapolis), Israel and the PA held serious negotiations that solved many but not all issues. Crucial, hard sticking points remain but that is what negotiations are for. Yes, Israel withdrew civilian settlers from Gaza in 2005, but it intentionally did so without a negotiated agreement and it followed the withdrawal by taking steps that guaranteed a negative outcome. In addition, Israel needs to stop focusing on tactics (freeze, not freeze) and recognize that for strategic reasons it needs this process to get a full work-out. If you will it, it is no dream.

In this context, a move by the PA for a status upgrade at the UNGA later this month is an opportunity not a threat. Here is a chance for Israel to encourage a political step and, by engaging, perhaps to help define the meaning and parameters of that step.

There are deeper factors potentially at play here. If the Palestinian people have something to lose – as in statehood, sovereign territory, access to Jerusalem – they will act in ways that protect such gains. If the PA has something real and meaningful to show from using politics, politics will get a better name. Politicians will be able to credibly argue, as they cannot right now, that politics can deliver substantive achievements.

Of course, this assumes the PA and Israel both want a two-state solution. I think Abbas and the Fatah leaders do. I have my doubts that the current Israeli government supports a Palestinian state in 95%+ of the West Bank and Jerusalem as a shared capital of two states. If they do not, scratch this option off the list. Then Israel is back to the waiting game, as in waiting until the Palestinians give up. Just contain or police (h/t Joshua Rovner) the Palestinian problem. I’d speculate that such waiting ends up highlighting the religious and generational aspects of the conflict because there is no way nationalism will just fade away. So people have to fall back on faith and the sweep of history to help them imagine what is likely impossible in reality.

Both political options have problems. But the way is which the past (e.g. Camp David, Gaza withdrawal) has been used to discredit them is deeply flawed. There is no military solution. Let politics have its day and see if there is a political one.

–

*It may be too late but you get the point.

Update: “The End of Deterrence” is also directly relevant here.

Time Loops and Israeli Decision-Making on Hamas

Palestinian militant groups are again firing tens of rockets across the Gaza border toward Israeli civilian targets. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak immediately warned that Hamas is responsible for the violence coming out of Gaza, and that the Israel Defense Forces might react by invading—again.

Others have already discussed the potential implications of the decision to use more military force against Gaza (here and here). In this extra-long piece, I want to consider the bigger picture of Israeli policymaking, and recommend that, notwithstanding the sensitive nature of the issue, it’s long past time for Israel to develop a new policy toward Gaza and Hamas.

Instead of conceptualizing Hamas as a tactical problem with short-term solutions—coerce it into accepting a short period of Israeli deterrence—Israel should think in strategic terms, with a policy accounting for how to engage Hamas long term. To do this, it needs to stop relying on its historical patterns of thinking.

Otherwise, it will be doomed to repeat the scenario again in the near future.

This is along the lines of what Giora Eiland, Israel’s former National Security Advisor, has been arguing for some time. Eiland contends that Israel should treat Gaza as an enemy state, and hold its rulers—Hamas—responsible for the attacks that come from it.

This makes sense, but it’s not clear that this will shift Israel’s view of Hamas from a short term military problem to be solved by military means—air strikes, incursions, and siege. The deeper problem is that Israel continues to use decision-making frameworks that have served it well in its past, but don’t reflect its needs in this moment.

The historical trend has been to rely on short-term, tactical maneuvering in response to real-time and urgent threats. There was good reason for this. The Jewish communities in Europe, under constant threat of persecution and isolation, had to improvise on a daily basis to remain safe. The Zionists in the Yishuv (Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine) followed this blueprint: struggling under difficult environmental and security conditions, with an unsteady supply of funds from outside the country and no protection from the governing authorities, it had to quickly develop self-sufficient methods of agriculture, politics, and security while adapting to changing local, regional, and global circumstances.

The 1947-49 War and the first decades of its existence furthered this pattern. Having to cope with more security threats—this time from the Arab states as well as Palestinian irregular militias—Israel also had to absorb hundreds of thousands of new immigrants and build the political, social, and economic infrastructure of the new state. This, without an assured and large enough stream of revenue, arms, and diplomatic support.

All of this forced Israel to react on the tactical level, making do with what it had. The ingenuity, informality, and heavier responsibility devolved to local leaders and commanders worked well enough under these conditions. Israel survived all of the threats against it, and thrived. But the cost was an ability to think strategically, and to re-conceptualize threats as challenges—which in turn require non-military solutions in addition to military ones. As Alan Dowty put it, the “filter of security” had come to dominate the Israeli worldview.

Such a framework is less effective in an established state that is the most prosperous and strongest power in its region.

Today, Israel has a flourishing domestic arms industry, a reliable flow of revenue from the diasporic Jewish community and the United States, a tight relationship with the latter (the world’s preeminent power), and an economy strong enough to survive better than others the recent economic crisis. It’s far more integrated into international forums than at any time since 1948, and it’s a veritable font of academic, scientific, and financial entrepreneurship and innovation.

At the same time, the nature of regional and global threats are changing—meaning Israel’s old framework for responding to them are increasingly less applicable. Where in the past, Israel successfully undermined its enemies’ ability to threaten it, today the Iranian nuclear program is more likely to remain in place than not, even if delayed. Where in the past Israel could count on the hostility of the Arab regimes but, by the 1970s, also their interest in avoiding direct conflict, today the Arab Awakening has changed the politics, and therefore the foreign policies, of some of these Arab states.

This is especially the case with Hamas. Indeed, Hamas has only grown stronger over the years, despite Israel’s efforts to degrade and contain it. It is at least partially responsible for Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005; it won the 2006 Palestinian legislative election; it seized by force control of all Gaza in 2007; and it’s increasingly being recognized as a legitimate player by Egypt, Turkey, some Gulf states, Europe, and even the United States, either explicitly or implicitly. Unlike Israel, Hamas has adapted well to the vicissitudes of the Arab Awakening, all the while expanding its rocket arsenal.

For its part, Hamas retains tight control over Gaza. It is now rooted in what Eiland called the Gazan state, and while Gazans themselves appear to resent its repression they give no indication of the will or ability to overthrow it. Nor is Fatah, Israel’s preferred Palestinian interlocutor, in any condition to overtake it in Palestinian politics.

At the same time, Hamas is under intermittent pressure to “prove” itself to Palestinians and others that it cannot be ignored. It is in constant competition with smaller paramilitary/terrorist groups, but it cannot shut them down completely. Yet it cannot allow them to set the “resistance” agenda. At some point, given these external threats and internal challenges from other domestic groups, Hamas will determine it needs to reassert its position as leader of the “resistance” against Israel, as we would expect from authoritarian regimes suffering from a lack of popular legitimacy.

Unable to close off its financial and diplomatic pipelines, Israel cannot destroy Hamas short of a full-scale invasion and sustained occupation. Given the sheer uncertainty of such a campaign, this is an unlikely outcome. Yet anything less will continue to impose severe threats on the Israeli population and considerable costs on the country in financial, military, and political terms.

It’s time for Israel to get ahead of the curve. Continually trying to restore the status quo ante is not a viable policy, and it cannot be effective long term.

Israel needs to rethink its approach to foreign policy, beginning by recognizing that while it is connected, it is not the same as security policy. The National Security Council (more accurately, the National Security Staff), Eiland’s former agency, should be given more legitimacy among decision-makers, and its discussions taken more seriously. The Winograd Commission that studied the 2006 Lebanon War recommended just such a change.

More concretely, Israel should encourage other states to engage with Hamas, to act as a conduit for discussion. Though it comes across as hypocritical when Turkey hits Israel for its reactions to Hamas yet sees nothing wrong with its own policies toward the PKK, Turkey has in the past proven a responsible mediator between Israel and Arab actors.

Israel should also engage others, like the US, the EU, Russia, and the Arab states to treat with Hamas more directly and openly. Trying to prevent them from doing so has clearly failed. But having multiple voices telling Hamas moderation is the only plausible avenue out of its siege will help the message sink in.

Jerusalem should also encourage Fatah and Hamas to resume their negotiations, by not treating them differently. The settlement enterprise might seem like a fait accompli to many, but the West Bank is a time bomb, which won’t spare anyone. Giving Hamas a stake in the entire Palestinian system and tying it to Fatah could well force it to work more responsibly.

At the same time, it should give the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank some sense that things are moving forward. Currently, both Fatah and Hamas have been rejected by Israel, despite adopting very different policies. But both need to see that negotiation, forswearing of violence, and cooperation are the only way to achieve positive outcomes.

Finally, Israel should respond immediately with limited aerial force to any barrage of rockets, with a set of pre-arranged contingency plans. Hamas needs to understand that its own security is more threatened by Israel than by fellow militant groups.

This will, in turn, require a more direct public conversation in Israel, rather than the blustering that substitutes for it in Israeli politics. Honesty about Israel’s real options regarding Hamas and the long-term efforts is important for the Israeli public, too.

However unpleasant it might be to recognize, every indication is that Hamas is here to stay. It will take a long time to convince it to change its behavior. The sooner Israel recognizes this, the sooner it can craft more effective policies toward it.

All Quiet on the North-Eastern Front

The Syrian civil war has now really spilled over into Israel, if in small doses. On November 3, three Syrian tanks rolled into the demilitarized zone in the Golan Heights. And yesterday, a stray bullet from Syria struck an Israeli jeep on the Heights. This, after Syrian shells fell on the Heights in September. While one can’t predict with certainty, it’s highly unlikely this will spark a direct Israeli intervention and Syria, and from there a wider regional war.

The argument that Israel would become involved is similar to the notion that Turkey will soon be drawn into Syria because of cross-border violence. That argument has been effectively disproved, and we can follow similar logics for explaining why Israel won’t, either.

First, while Israel certainly preferred the Asad regime to maintain stability on the border—just as it preferred Hosni Mubarak in Egypt—and fears the uncertainty generated by the Syrian violence, its disastrous intervention in Lebanon in 1982 taught it about the pitfalls of trying to arrange the internal politics of its neighbors. Sending the IDF into Syria is the only way to stop all violence across the border, but doing so runs the risk of drawing Israel into Syrian politics by tipping the balance in the fighting. But anything less than an invasion, even if it’s limited, will look unnecessarily aggressive and petty.

Second, any intervention in Syria would have no clear purpose. Asad isn’t looking for a fight with Israel, as he isn’t looking for one with Turkey. Nor does the Syrian opposition want the Israeli army fighting alongside it. Israel would have no military objective worth the price of being tied to the war, and no clear exit strategy.

Indeed, as the jihadists in the opposition, already known for their resentment toward Israel, are increasingly well-armed, Israel would find itself facing a situation in which the local forces turn their attention to Israel, Hezbollah-like. Getting mired in a guerrilla war against Syrian opposition groups at a time when Israel is already facing uncertainty on the border with Egypt, the unresolved Iranian nuclear issue, the teetering of the Palestinian Authority, and a resurgent Hamas would be an unnecessary provocation at a time when Israel’s focus is needed on genuine threats.

Third, that Iranian issue remains Israel’s primary focus. Military intervention in Syria would sap time, attention, and resources from the Iranian file.

Fourth, Israel is in the midst of an election campaign. While that’s not a guarantee that the government wouldn’t engage in military action if it deemed it necessary, responding to a few inadvertent hits from the Syrian military hunting down the Syrian opposition doesn’t classify as “necessary.” It would also put Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more on the defensive against his electoral rivals, some of whom are already hitting him on his belligerency toward Iran and his failure on the peace process. Netanyahu is risk-averse, and the balance sheet on intervening in Syria puts the disadvantages at far, far greater value than the advantages.

All of the cross-border violence has been limited, and hasn’t reached over the Golan to hit the more densely-populated Northern Galilee. The primary purpose of holding on to the Golan has been for its strategic value: as a plateau overlooking northern Israel and into Syria, it acts as both a defensive barrier and a potential launching point. A few shells or bullets, or poorly-guided tanks, aren’t enough to change that calculation.

It remains to be seen if Syrian regime forces will, accidentally or while fighting the rebels, engage in more serious violence. But even if it does, my guess is that Israel will continue to lodge official complaints with the United Nations and raise its alert levels, but no more. The Syrian violence simply doesn’t pose a serious enough threat to Israel for anything more.

Cutting Off Its Nose to Spite Its Face

Given the Israeli government’s reaction to the Palestinian Authority’s plan to ask the UN for non-member observer state status, you’d think the PA was asking the General Assembly to resolve Israel out of existence. The government has threatened to “go crazy,” while the Prime Minister’s office apparently intends to show the Palestinians “what’s what.” The most extreme measures contemplated are building lots more settlements and halting transfers of tax revenue to the PA.

Put another way, Israel is being extremely short-sighted, and if it follows through with its threats, will put itself at great risk.

Mahmoud Abbas seems bent on pursuing this course while ignoring all the signals of lasting damage that could be done to the Palestinian government and the two-state solution. To be fair, virtually all of his options have been taken away from him: distracted by the American election, Iran, the Arab Awakening, and the rising power of Hamas, nobody is supporting the PA, leaving it to struggle alone against far more powerful forces. Although Abbas could do far, far more to convince Israel that he’s genuinely committed to peace negotiations, there’s no evidence that the government of Benjamin Netanyahu is interested and would take seriously any offers.

But still, Israel’s over-reaction is creating a situation in which it will be responsible for the collapse of the PA. It’s hard to see how this would benefit Israel. The West Bank will then be opened up to greater penetration by Hamas; the security cooperation between Israel and the PA, which has been successful at containing most violence and threats against Israelis, will end; the Salam Fayyad administration, which has been busy stabilizing the Palestinian economy—no small feat under contemporary conditions—and ensuring international support for a moderate government will disappear.

More settlements will also mean more settler violence against Palestinians and their property, which in turn will undermine the legitimacy and authority of the Israeli state.

It’s hard not to come to the conclusion that a third intifada is the likely outcome here, and moreover that Israel is simply not prepared for it or will be able to respond effectively. This is the conclusion reached by many Israel analysts and former military and intelligence officials; at best, serving officials argue, the current “quiet” in the West Bank is temporary. Nobody can say what form such an uprising would take, but coming while the nuclear issue with Iran is unresolved, the Syrian civil war rages, relations with Egypt continue to be marked by uncertainty, and the Sinai remains a source of danger, Israel cannot afford to direct soldiers and resources to the West Bank.

This is the moment for hard decisions in Israel, most of which go against long-standing assumptions and expectations. A broader policy framework needs to be constructed, one that incorporates policy toward Hamas/Gaza and the PA/West Bank. A firmer assertion of the state supremacy over domestic groups should complement this. And a more realistic assessment of the settlements is necessary.

The nature of governmental decision-making in Israel combined with the continual threats to the country hasn’t facilitated this kind of long-term thinking. The experience of surviving and prospering under all kinds of adverse conditions also engenders a kind of we-will-persevere-no-matter-what presumption.

These conditions are dangerous for the country’s future security, welfare, and stability. What will it take to get the country to take all this seriously?