Erdoğan as Özal

As expected, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared his presidential candidacy, making it all but assured that he’ll become the country’s first directly-elected president. Despite the widespread criticisms of his heavy-handed rule, his dismissal of the rule of law, his contempt for dissent, and his general insensitivity to problems not his own, Erdoğan remains very popular in a large portion of the electorate, while much of the rest does not dislike him (or the AKP) or mistrust him enough to vote for any other candidate.

Like a previous prime minister and president, Turgut Özal, Erdoğan is running for president for a simple reason: he’s not ready to retire from power. He loves it too much, and genuinely believes he’s a force for good for Turkey. He doesn’t have any other options to meet these needs: He’s not well liked on the international stage, like Abdullah Gül, and so cannot transition into a position at an international organization like the United Nations. Nor is there any other office in Turkey that, after the prime ministry, can afford him the chance to continue to influence Turkish politics and development.

Though he failed to get the parliament to endorse his version of a stronger presidency, Erdoğan will—like Özal before him—continue to dominate Turkish political life. As I noted, “It’s unlikely that whoever the AKP runs for prime minister will be strong enough to resist Erdoğan’s all-but-assured interference in governing.” We can expect that he’ll continue to pronounce on the conduct of Turks’ private lives and on how to develop the country. He’ll view the election as a mandate for his vision, which will make him even less interested in hearing criticisms of how he’s handled things—if that’s possible.

There are some rumors or hints that Abdullah Gül is considering running for prime minister. This might qualify what I said above: Gül will pose a stronger challenge to Erdoğan. Though Gül doesn’t have a solid power base in the party, he does have supporters. As prime minister he’ll have legal and statutory powers with which to withstand Erdoğan’s meddling. And as prime minister, he’ll be expected to make firm decisions on issues, unlike the hesitant and waffling pronouncements he made as president in order to avoid conflict with Erdoğan. If Gül acts assertively, then, we can anticipate some clashes over governing.

What will be interesting to see is how Erdoğan acts on the world stage. He’s not as popular among world leaders as the current president, or as Özal was, which probably irks Erdoğan. This will constrain his ability to be taken as seriously. I don’t think it’s likely he’ll moderate his conduct to play the role of elder statesman; it’s not in his nature. Also, there could well be further troubles for him in Turkey related to financial inappropriateness, the government’s harsh response to Gezi and the anti-corruption probe, and the mining accident, which will put him on the defensive. Erdoğan gets very ornery when he’s on the defensive.

In short, we can expect Turkish politics to continue to be exciting during Erdoğan’s presidential term.

 

The End of Iraq? Or Not….

We again welcome a guest post from James Devine:

With ISIS’ shocking invasion of Mosul this week, there has been speculation that this turn of events will eventually lead to the collapse of the Iraqi state along ethno-religious lines, and perhaps even the establishment of a Salafi Islamic Emirate straddling what is now the border of Iraq and Syria. This may eventually come to pass, however it is still too early to say where this week’s events will lead. There is a complex web of political dynamics at work in Iraq and its environs, some tearing the state apart, some also holding it together.

Given the sudden nature of ISIS’ victory in Mosul and the equally stunning collapse of Iraqi national forces in the city, it’s easy to imagine the militia running the table in Iraq. Within 24 hours of seizing Mosul, ISIS grabbed Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s home village and a Ba’thist strong hold, and is moving toward Baghdad with approximately 6,000 fighters. This is in addition to large parts of Fallujah and Ramadi, which ISIS has controlled since the beginning of the year. The seizure of Mosul also netted ISIS approximately $425 million dollars, making it by some estimates the richest “terrorist” organization in the world. As ISIS’ successes mount, and its resource base expands, it will be able to attract more political followers. While ISIS has already been able to mobilize some disgruntled Iraqi Sunnis and anti-government tribes, it remains a relatively small organization. Mosul, for instance, was taken by approximately 800 fighters. However, if it can hold Mosul and make further gains around the state capital, ISIS’ following will likely grow and the Iraqi state would be fractured.

While this scenario is possible ISIS faces a number of substantial hurdles. First, and foremost, routing the Iraqi national army is one thing, fighting the Kurdish Peshmerga is something else altogether. The Peshmerga is well prepared and combat tested in Najaf (2004) against the Mahdi Army, and the second battle of Fallujah (2004) against Sunni insurgents. They are not likely to cut and run at the sight of 800 members of ISIS. They already appear to have taken control of Kirkuk and are likely preparing for Mosul. Moreover, President Hassan Rouhani has volunteered Iranian support and there are already reports of Iranian military units being dispatched to Iraq. It is not in Iran’s interest to have Iraq dissolve into chaos, and the IRGC along with Hezbollah are already fighting ISIS in Syria. Finally, ISIS continues to face threats to their home base in Syria. ISIS is not just fighting the Syrian government and its allies, but Syrian Kurdish groups and even other Salafi groups such as the al-Nusra Front. If ISIS stays in Iraq they will be fighting a war on two fronts against multiple enemies.

Having said this, while the military defeat of ISIS would end the immediate threat of Iraq splitting apart, it may trigger a slower but no less unstoppable breakdown of the state. Mosul and Kirkuk are on the Green Line that marks territories disputed by both the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdish autonomous government in Erbil. Tensions between central government forces and Peshmerga forces have been high, particularly since the creation of the Dijla Operations Command in Kirkuk in 2012. Erbil saw the creation of this military command as a land grab, but did not use force to stop it. The decision not to confront Baghdad at the time received a great deal of criticism from within the Kurdish political community. It is therefore very unlikely that Erbil will give up the control it now has over Kirkuk, or the control of Mosul it would have if it expels ISIS in the future. These cities are important symbolically to Erbil, and important because they are the home to large Kurdish populations. They are also important because of oil. Indeed, it has been argued that controlling the energy resources around Kirkuk would give the KRG the income necessary for it to make the final break with Baghdad.

Even if Erbil did not decide the time was right to declare independence, the fact that the Iraqi state had to be saved by the Peshmerga and the IRGC may simply be too much. Iraq spent eight years at war with Iran in the 1980s and has been fighting the Kurds off and on since the country achieved independence. Now they are all that is left holding the Iraq state together? Certainly this would further alienate the country’s Sunni population. It would also signal the Shi’a population that the Malaki government is not up to the job. Although Malaki has earned his share of criticism, given the political divisions within Iraq, it is unclear that anyone else would be able to fill his shoes. Political deadlock and dissatisfaction could erode the state on their own while the Kurds simply wait out the process .

Despite all of this, there is reason to believe Iraq may continue to muddle along. While the state may be in disarray internally, none of its neighbors want to see it break up. Neither Turkey nor Iran wants to see an independent Kurdish state because of the potential impact on their Kurdish populations. Neither, of course, do the Syrians. The Syrians may not be able to do much about the situation but Iran and Turkey can. Both states have heavily infiltrated the Kurdish autonomous region and could create havoc if their interests were threatened. To the extent Iran helps fight ISIS, their influence over Iraqi internal politics will be significantly enhanced. Turkey also has leverage over the KRG because it is the main destination for Kurdish energy exports. The KRG has tried to build good relations with Turkey so that one day Ankara may not see and independent Kurdistan as a threat. However the relationship between the two has been strained by the fighting in Syria where Ankara has supported the opposition, includingISIS and other Salafi groups that have clashed with Kurds in the eastern part of the country.

The Saudis and the other Sunni states would be equally opposed to the breakup of Iraq. They see Iraq as a fellow member of the Sunni community. Not only would they be opposed to its dissolution on principle, if it were to break up they fear the immediate beneficiary would be Shi’a Iran. From Riyadh’s perspective in particular, things are already going far too much in Iran’s favor.

Given the opposition of Iraq’s neighbors, and the potential for instability, it is difficult to see the US supporting the dismemberment of Iraq either. There may be sympathy for Kurdish independence in Washington, but the US is focused on making a deal with Iran and managing its troubled relationship with Saudi Arabia. It is even harder to see the US going along with idea if there was any possibility that it would allow an Al-Qaeda-like Salafi organization to set up its own state right in the middle of the Levant.

The point being made here is not that Iraq will or will not break up because of what has happened this week. The point is simply that there is no straight line between ISIS’ capture of Mosul and the collapse of the Iraqi state. While this week’s events will leave an indelible mark on Iraqi politics, there are too many unknowns in the equation to make long term predictions. As we should have learned through the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and 80s, and the current civil war in Syria, there is no way to predict what kind of alliances may form or how they may influence the outcome of events. Who knows, ISIS is a threat to the interests of the Americans, the Iranians, the Saudis, the Shi’a, the Kurds, and to moderate Iraqi Sunnis. They have even fallen out with Turkey. Perhaps this crisis will give them common cause to cooperate. Or, not…

 

How Erdoğan Has Reshaped Turkish Politics

Over at The Monkey Cage I have a piece on what the corruption scandals in Turkey mean for Turkish politics. A brief snippet:

Leaders who see themselves as infallible and who have no institutional constraints on their ability to make policy don’t leave power willingly. This can include leaders elected democratically. They weaken political institutions in their campaign to fend off challengers and remain in office. So whether or not Erdoğan survives is less important for Turkey than the damage being done to Turkish institutions, which in turn poses a real challenge for American interests in the Middle East that depend heavily on a strong Turkey.

Follow the link for more.

Turkish Politics is Exciting Again

From about 2002 to 2013, Turkish politics was boring. The AKP had come to dominate the political system, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had come to dominate the AKP. The Turkish Armed Forces, having seemingly expended its last strength pushing Necmettin Erbakan out in 1997, was moving in slow motion, unable or unwilling to confront the AKP government and stop the hemorrhaging of its own autonomy and power. No credible political alternative existed to either Erdoğan or the AKP, leaving elections to be more about how much stronger the two might get than a real contest for power.

The outbreak of the Gezi protests in May followed by this week’s anti-corruption probe turns everything on its head. The latter, in particular, represents the most serious threat to Erdoğan’s power since 2002. It’s clear now that the AKP’s dominance has its limits; significant and various groups within Turkish society and politics don’t accept the increasing authoritarianism of the party or its leader. What’s not clear is how long opposition to the AKP can be maintained, and what the outcome of this very public clash might be. But some things that bear watching are:

1. It is, as Michael Koplow reminds us, part of a long-simmering rivalry between the Justice and Development Party and the Gülen movement. Both are powerful and entrenched in the Turkish polity and in society, which potentially makes this struggle very destructive of Turkey’s institutions. Erdoğan’s decision to eliminate the dershanes (preparatory schools designed to help Turks study for university entrance exams but run by Gülen), the anti-corruption investigation itself (which is looking into banks, politicians, and business enterprises), and the AKP’s campaign of dismissing police chiefs and investigators (widely seen as a response to the anti-corruption probe) will leave some gaps in important Turkish institutions. How—or whether—they are filled could have long-term effects.

2. Was 2002-2013 an incubation period? The rise to power of Erdoğan and the AKP was facilitated by the infighting and self-inflicted, mortal wounds of the secular parties, most of which vanished by 2002, and the unrepentant radicalism of Erbakan and the Welfare Party. This left the political field open to the AKP, without any serious challengers. It might be that rivals and opposition parties needed that time to recharge and re-form. I’m skeptical of such a process, since neither of the two existing non-AKP parties (The Republican People’s Party and the Nationalist Action Party) have the public support, organizational reach, or political savvy necessary to directly challenge the AKP and its leaders; and there aren’t any viable alternatives on the horizon either. But maybe in retrospect something else will be obvious.

3. The economy. I think that while both Gezi and the current anti-corruption probe pose serious challenges to the AKP and Erdoğan, there is still a long way to go before either loses power. These political processes might undermine their ability to protect their interests and promote loyal allies, but per my second point, it won’t matter without a political alternative. But the economic fallout of this instability could have a larger, longer, and more immediate effect. And because much of Erdoğan’s popularity rests on economic development and the economic gains that Turks have reaped since the 2000s, his and the AKP’s allure will be tarnished if these trends stall significantly or are reversed.

4. Is there hope for Abdullah Gül? Observers have long wondered about the polite rivalry between Erdoğan and Gül, the two preeminent leaders of the AKP. Conventional wisdom is that their respective powers are locked into a zero-sum game. On this point, Henri Barkey has a very interesting piece at Al-Monitor discussing whether Gül will, in fact, be the ultimate beneficiary of the Erdoğan-Gülen spat.

5. Finally, how will all of this affect Turkish foreign policy? Ankara’s international policy is in flux since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, but it hasn’t been stable since the end of the Cold War. Given Erdoğan’s tendency to see international conspiracies everywhere, he is likely to emphasize this point as part of his reaction to the anti-corruption probe. But more worrisome is how distracting this will be to Turkey’s efforts to construct a viable foreign policy in the region. Given Turkey’s economic and diplomatic weight in the Middle East, a Turkey that staggers around without a clear sense of direction will make resolving the region’s problems that much more difficult. And as Turkey has trouble getting others to take it seriously again, it will continue to feed Turkish perceptions of Otherness, superiority, and wounded pride, undermining its ability to look after its own interests and work constructively with allies.

Lieberman is Back

Avigdor Lieberman has been acquitted of all charges of fraud and breach of trust. This will have considerable effects on Israeli politics and foreign policy.

As Carlo Strenger writes, Lieberman will now feel emboldened and be in a stronger position to pursue his goal of becoming the top leader of the right in Israel. This will, as Amir Mizroch notes, have a direct impact on coalition politics in Israel.

In foreign policy terms it’s likely the impact will be even starker. A country like Israel—small, in a protracted conflict, surrounded by hostile forces—relies heavily on great power support. Yet Washington is already suspicious of Jerusalem’s intentions, while Europe is increasingly willing to separate Israel from the West Bank. These conditions require Jerusalem to navigate varied and sometimes conflicting interests and pressures with nuance, tact, a long-term perspective, and a commitment to maintaining friendly and close relations with its benefactors. Lieberman is not the man to do this.

He is better known for his bombast and belligerence than his discretion and diplomatic skills. In 2001 he proclaimed that Israel should bomb Egypt’s Aswan Dam if Cairo turned its back on Israel. In 2009, when Shimon Peres and Ehud Olmert apologized to Hosni Mubarak for Lieberman’s comment that Hosni Mubarak can “go to hell,” Lieberman compared their behavior to that of a “battered wife.” In 2010, at a private dinner, he scolded French and Spanish leaders on solving Europe’s problems first before turning to the Middle East; he then gave his comments to the Israeli press. In 2012, he equated Europe’s position toward Israel with its position toward the Jews in the period leading to the Holocaust. This August he compared Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels.

None of this is helpful and there’s no evidence Lieberman has learned to temper his reactions to decisions and events he doesn’t agree with. Take two of Israel’s most urgent foreign policy issues: the peace process and reconciliation with Turkey.

The peace talks with the Palestinians have certainly been difficult from the beginning, and they may be breaking down even sooner than expected. But if Lieberman disdains Arab and European leaders for not adopting Jerusalem’s positions, he seems to hate Palestinian leaders, particularly Mahmoud Abbas. In theory he supports a two-state solution, and has even claimed he’d leave his home in the settlement of Nokdim if it is actually achieved. But in practice his conditions don’t leave much room for progress: he mistrusts the Palestinians, wants a very constrained Palestinian state, opposes the division of Jerusalem, and prefers to exchange Palestinian citizens of Israel for settlers.

Israel is also at a delicate moment in the reconciliation process with Turkey. Granted, the process is stalled because of the Turkish government’s reluctance to move forward. But at least there is a process, a forum for discussion. Lieberman would prefer there be no process at all. Recall that the Israeli apology to Turkey for what happened on the Mavi Marmara took place only after Lieberman left office. He was adamantly opposed to any expression of wrongdoing, and generally thinks apologizing is poor policy and a reflection of weakness.

It is certainly not all Israel’s fault that it’s in the position it is. The Palestinians and Turks deserve their full share of the blame for lack of movement in their negotiations, for instance. But Jerusalem cannot escape its responsibilities, either. With Lieberman as Foreign Minister and a member of the innermost cabinet, Israel’s positions on these and other issues will harden. Even apart from his personal inclinations, his reinvigorated effort to follow Benjamin Netanyahu into the prime ministry will push him and his rivals to adopt more hardline policies as they compete for support from their rightist base. All of this will make it much more difficult to strengthen ties, build trust, and persuade others of the validity of Israel’s position.

Foreign policy—again, especially for small states—requires the ability to adapt to changing conditions, constraints, and opportunities. It’s just not clear Lieberman is interested in doing so.

Will the Egyptian Coup Affect Other Islamist Groups?

In the aftermath of the Egyptian military’s overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government, observers have started to wonder what effect the coup will have on Islamist groups throughout the region. Shadi Hamid argues that the coup will have “profound implications for the future of political Islam, reverberating across the region in potentially dangerous ways.” It could well, he continued, convince such groups that participation in the political process is unwise. Less apocalyptically, Barbara Slavin contends that “Morsi’s removal is a warning that Islamic parties cannot count on religious identity alone to govern successfully and need to work constructively with others.”

The juxtaposition of these two pieces highlights the difficulty in trying to understand the coup’s potential consequences for the kinds of decisions other Islamist groups might make. But short of direct knowledge of the discussions Islamist leaders are holding behind closed doors, we cannot know for certain what drives their decisions. A glance at the history of Islamist involvement in pluralist politics suggests that the response is likely to be diverse and not a simple “no to elections.”

First, the specific countries or actors used for comparison matter. Hamid looks only at al-Qaeda, a group that has never suggested it might engage in the political process or that it should lay down its arms for a trial run at democracy. There’s no evidence that jihadist groups will change much of their behavior because of the coup. Alternately, will they plan more attacks out of fear they are on the defensive? Target more governments? Perhaps, but it’s also likely they would have done so if countries were becoming more democratic anyway, without the participation of Islamist parties.

Will McCants suggests that of comparable groups that do decide to participate, Salafi parties tend to be too radical and small to obtain broad support within the political system and so can participate without having to face the kind of choice the Brotherhood did. What Salafi violence might be precipitated seems due as much to intra-Islamist politics as anything else. (McCants continues that it’s too early to draw firm predictions.)

Slavin considers Turkey and Iran. But in the former, the AKP split off from the more hardline Welfare Party and may already have been undergoing a mild internal struggle over the character of the party. In fact, the military coup that ousted the first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, and the subsequent campaign to shut the party down convinced Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that participation in the democratic process was quite necessary. In Iran, the government is structured along a strict but specific interpretation of Shia Islam as conceived of by Ayatollah Khomeini that none of the main actors within the state want to change.

Second, the history of Islamist groups in the Middle East suggests that coups or similar “shocks” against them or Islamist parties in other states haven’t prevented non-jihadist groups from participating in democratic processes. In December 1991 the Algerian military cancelled elections in which the Islamic Salvation Front appeared to be doing very well, leading to a vicious civil war that lasted into the 2000s and killed over 100,000 Algerians. In 1997 the Turkish Armed Forces removed the first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, and then proceeded to purge Islamists from government, the bureaucracy, and the military.

Yet in 2002 the Justice and Development Party (AKP by its Turkish acronym) participated in national Turkish elections. In January 2006 Hamas participated in Palestinian elections. After its victory, Israel, the United States, Canada, and others began to hold back funds they had been channeling to the Palestinian Authority; after Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in June 2007, Israel—again supported by the US and Canada—imposed a blockade on the entire Strip. In July 2007 and then in 2011, the AKP continued to participate in parliamentary polls (winning the government both times). In 2008-2009 and 2012 Israel attacked Hamas in Gaza, forcing it to seek a ceasefire in both wars. And in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt actively participated in elections despite the fact that the military—once their nemesis—remained a powerful actor, while in Libya the process is complicated by the existence of both jihadist groups and parties that want to participate.

The evidence is only suggestive, but it’s enough to demonstrate that coups or similar shocks against Islamists haven’t precluded participation in subsequent democratic processes. But we need more than sweeping statements for effective comparisons, so that our conclusions are not skewed.

Academics, the Media, and the Turkish Protests

At the multi-authored blog, Political Violence @ a Glance, Christian Davenport laments the state of analysis on the protests in Turkey. Giving voice to what I’m sure many of us academics ask ourselves (and our spouses, partners, and close colleagues)—why isn’t my scholarly work being cited?—Davenport wonders why what is now considered the “mainstream media” haven’t called on academics for their expertise. We write on the general issues that are playing out in specific contexts (“case studies,” in academic terms), and so it stands to reasons our insights matter and could contribute much to explaining what’s happening.

Later in his piece Davenport explains why he looked only at the New York Times for his evidence—it’s America’s paper of record, normally has good coverage of events, and has many readers. This seems reasonable. But there are lots and lots and lots of excellent analyses out there on the protests, written by scholars, activists, journalists, and analysts—many of whom are not American. Most of it isn’t in the mainstream media, though some of it is. Rather, it is written in blogs, online magazines, and other sources. It is shared through a Twitter community that, unfortunately, seems to incorporate only or mostly Turks or long-time Turkey watchers.

In the first few days of the expanding protests, for example, I compiled a list of what I thought were good analyses of what was happening. Sources included Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, many personal blogs, and a host of other non-mainstream media publications. If you exclude the first two sources, only a couple—The Telegraph, The Wall Street Journal—could fall into the mainstream media category.

Davenport’s discussion raises three important and inter-related questions that are increasingly being debated in academia. First, how cloistered (or not) is the nature of academic life? Clearly Davenport doesn’t live or work in a cloister (see the categories on his blog for proof). But it would be interesting to know if, in trying to see what “the media” has said about the Turkish protests, he read the other literature I cited in my list. The expansion of social media has allowed academics who want to study an ongoing phenomenon to read for real-time evidence more than just the standard media. How many scholars take advantage of this?

Second, then, what is the role of the academic in public life, particularly with the emergence of social media? Davenport is right that most scholars are ignored far too much in the mainstream media—including television, radio, and print. If our stuff isn’t getting out there, we should wonder why “they” (the journalists) aren’t contacting us. But we should also ask whether we have been writing on topics for a too-small, already-inclined audience. Some, certainly; but I think the accusation that academics don’t think in policy terms or write only esoterically is too much of a straw man.

The question then becomes, how can we get our analyses out there? It’s hard to get an op-ed published in one of the big media outlets; that’s partly why many of us write for other places, including our own blogs. It’s as much, if not more, our responsibility to get our work out there.

And following from this, the third question: How can we resolve the ever-present tension between the generalist and the area-studies specialist? Davenport’s point is well taken: scholars often write on a general topic, the implications and findings of which can be applied to different cases/developments. Comparative analysis is extremely useful, even necessary. In the case of the Turkish protests, for instance, one wonders whether the Arab Awakening is the closest similar experience; or whether it’s the J14 demonstrations in Israel; or whether it’s something else or some combination. Whatever the answer, there are—as Davenport rightly noted—insights to be gleaned from previous work on the topic of social protests and movements.

This brings me back to my first point. I agree with what Davenport is trying to do. But I wonder whether he went far enough in his analysis. The New York Times is mainstream, and what academic wouldn’t love to publish an op-ed in it? But much of the deeper, contextual analysis is being written up elsewhere. If we academics don’t account for that, too, then we’re not keeping up with the times, so to speak.