Blaming Shelly Yacimovich

Uri Misgav has written a scathing post taking apart Shelly Yacimovich’s leadership of Israel’s Labor Party. He raises a number of good points, but I think he’s also a little unfair to her. But most important, I think he mistakes Yacimovich’s problems at the helm for problems in party itself. Put another way, if Labor—and Laborites—commit to some serious changes, Yacimovich’s “faults” will appear less tragic and self-induced.

Misgav starts off criticizing Yacimovich for wanting to move the party’s primaries up in order to avoid potential competition from potentially attractive candidates like Gabi Ashkenazi. By doing so he seems to want to tar her with an unprecedented cynicism and lust for power—as though all of Labor’s leaders were not driven by the same motivations.

But consider what the party’s most recent leaders have done. Ehud Barak literally broke the party up so he could remain in government. Amir Peretz and Amram Mitzna abandoned the party when they couldn’t get everything they wanted and went over to Tzipi Livni’s center-right party, where they thought they’d have more influence. Shimon Peres, too, left the party to join Ariel Sharon’s center-right Kadima. Does it sound like Yacimovich is doing anything out of the ordinary?

Misgav then critiques Yacimovich’s decisions during the recent electoral campaign, faulting her for Labor’s meager improvement of only two seats out of what he calculates to be 32 up for grabs. As I’ve argued before, not all of Labor’s less-than-stellar results are Yacimovich’s fault.

Importantly, I’m not sure that Mizgav’s assumption of 32 seats available to Labor is accurate under the conditions of the election. The appearance of Hatnua and Yesh Atid were beyond Yacimovich’s control, and the Israeli public likes to throw some votes to third parties, at least for a single election.

In addition, polling data told the party that the public was simply less interested in talking about the conflict with the Palestinians or the settlements; their top concerns were domestic social and economic problems. While talking mostly about these matters, she also reinvigorated the party by bringing in new candidates who were known to be focused on these issues. But I do agree with Misgav that Yacimovich’s mistake on this issue was, when she became willing to talk about it, to try to seem more rightwing than Labor has been in recent years in order to siphon off potential Yesh Atid and then Hatnua voters. It’s not clear how convincing she could be, and she lost some leftwing voters who were turned off by her seeming turn to the center-right.

In short, it’s not Yacimovich that is the problem here, but the party’s internal laws that threaten a leader so soon after elections. And it’s the fault of its top politicians who always see themselves as the more competent, even rightful, leader of the party.

Labor’s power has been in decline for many years, and it’s simply not realistic to expect one person to change all of that around over the course of one election. What the party needs is a long period of unity so that it can work on expanding its grassroots organization, craft a clear and consistent message to the Israeli public, and accept its leader’s right to remain in the position for a significant period of time. Until that happens, Laborites and pundits will continue to blame the leader for the party’s deeper problems.

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Politics and Pathologies in Israeli National Security Decision Making

Yesterday in The Atlantic I wrote about the politics and pathologies in Israeli national security decision-making, with a specific focus on the National Security Council.

Here’s how it starts:

Imagine this: Israel strikes Iranian nuclear facilities, destroying some and damaging others. Iran fires missiles back at Israel and “activates” Hezbollah on the northern border. Hamas, deciding this is an opportune moment, starts shooting its own rockets into the southern and coastal areas of Israel.

This is an entirely plausible scenario. It’s also one that Israel expects. What’s less clear is whether Israel has thought through the rest of the implications of a strike on Iran: the impact on the economy; the length of time citizens will need to be mobilized for military service; the reaction of its friends, allies, and neutral states; and how it will coordinate a multi-tiered response on all these fronts.

Follow the link for more.

The Knesset’s Opportunity

Amir Mizroch has smartly laid out what Israeli party leaders, especially Yair Lapid, need to do for the good of the country. But today the Knesset also has an opportunity to effect real change in Israel.

Historically Israel’s parliament has not been very strong vis-à-vis the government. The structure of the electoral system, the nature of coalition governments, the sheer variety of parties in the Knesset, and the security situation (which privileges government secrecy and allows for lots of latitude in decision-making) all combine to strengthen the executive at the expense of the legislature.

But if enough of its members work together on specific issues, the Knesset can, I think, push for important changes on a wide range of domestic issues. Of course some members will be inside the government and some outside of it. But with coalition agreements always resting on a knife’s edge, and many new activists now in parliament, there are several issues they can find common ground on, even apart from the most prominent one (sharing the burden). There is a real need for changing societal attitudes about race and ethnicity, improving the status of women, reforming the education system, developing infrastructure, finding a more equitable distribution of resources, and teaching tolerance between communal and sectarian groups.

Yesh Atid’s list is filled with people who have worked in these and other areas. So is Labor’s. Even Tzipi Livni’s Hatnua has Amir Peretz and Amram Mitzna. A strengthened Meretz and a bloc of Arab parties that are also concerned with the same issues could add further votes to any such efforts.

Moreover, Livni and the Arab parties could leverage their support for domestic issues into reinforcement for their other concern, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This, in turn, has a feedback loop for the reduction in militarism in Israeli society, the clamping down on dissent, and a decline in the politics of fear.

The obstacles to this kind of cooperation are numerous, obviously. That doesn’t make it any less important to try. If the speeches that many Knesset members have given at their inauguration are anything to go by, and individuals can put aside their own political ambitions and petty squabbling, there is a chance.